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Andre Hampton • 
There can be no doubt but that more medical care at a less expensive 
cost is needed today. However, where the health of the American 
citizen is at stake, Machiavellian rationale does not and should not 
apply. 
According to court papers, a Saginaw Michigan HMO patient with 
vaginal bleeding was given antibiotics for five months before her 
doctor sent her to a gynecologist. The specialist checked her for 
venereal disease, found nothing and told her to return in a month. 
However, her primary care doctor refused to approve a second visit. 
Eight months after her initial visit, she went to an emergency room 
where doctors performed a biopsy and discovered she had cervical 
cancer. The HMO had set up financial pools to cover patients' 
specialist appointments, tests and hospital care. Money left over at 
the end of the year was split between the doctor and the HMO. 
According to Circuit Judge Robert L. Kacmarek, ruling on the 
HMO's motion for summary judgment: "The result was that the 
fewer referrals a doctor made and the fewer hospitalizations he 
ordered for his patients, the more money he made." 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Most patients, even patients in health maintenance organizations (HMOs),4 
do not comprehend the true magnitude of the changes in the basic relationship 
between physicians and patients. Patients may believe that they have a more 
difficult time obtaining services which they and their physicians believe are 
necessary.5 However, patients remain largely unconscious about the financial 
incentives that are designed to encourage physicians to eliminate services 
which are not "medically necessary."6 The patient is even less aware of the 
potential conflict of interest that such financial incentives pose for the 
physician-patient relationship. 7 When a medical mishap occurs and a 
Id. 
With a pink hotel, A boutique-
And a swinging hot spot. 
Don't it always seem to go 
That you don't know what you've got 
Till it's gone 
They paved paradise. 
And put up parking lot. 
4. "An HMO is an organized system of health care delivery for both hospital and physician services 
in which care delivery and financing functions are offered by one organization. HMOs provide both 
services to an enrolled membership for a ftxed and prepaid fee ." Vernellia R . Randall, Mfmllgtd Care, 
UtilitaJion Review, and Financial RisJc Shijling: Compensaling Palimt.s for Health Cart Cost ConJainmmt Injuries, 17 U. 
PuGET SOUND L. REV. I, 20 (1994). As of 1995, there were 550 health maintenance organizations 
(HMOs) in operation in the United States and 46.2 million people enrolled in HMOs. U.S. DEPARTMENT 
OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, HEALTH UNITED STATES 1995, 262, tbl.l36. 
5. S« Press Release from The Robert Wood johnson Foundation, Sick Ptopk In Mfmllgtd Care Have 
Difficul!J C.Uing Seruias and TrtalmmJ (June 28, 1995) (on file with the UnUiersi!J o/ CinciruuzJi Law &view) 
(relating results of survey on non-elderly sick persons conducted over an eleven month period from june 
1994-1995 by the Harvard School of Public Health & Louis Harris & A. Associates). 
6. "Medically necessary" is the proverbial tail that wags the dog. There are currently close to one 
trillion dollars spent each year on medical services. There is much speculation about this amount, and 
whether it reflects the cost of medically necessary procedures. This concept is fairly ill-defined and has 
undergone some changes which are reflected in the discourse in this Article. At one point, all services 
ordered by a physician were thought to be medically necessary. The phrase "medically necessary" now 
generally assumes a definition somewhat akin to the following definition found in the rules and regulations 
of the Civilian Health & Military Program of the Uniform Services (a health insurance program for 
members of the military and their dependents): "The frequency, extent, types of medical services or 
supplies which represent appropriate medical care and but are generally accepted by qualified professionals 
to be reasonable and adequate for the diagnosis and treatment of illness, injury, pregnancy." 32 C.F.R . 
§199.2 (1997). This language is similar to language found in a typical health insurance policy. S«, e.g., 
Overcash v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield, 381 S.E.2d 330, 335 (N.C. Ct. App. 1989) (contract defines 
medically necessary as "appropriate with regards to standards of good medical practice"). 
7. It is generally assumed that HMO enrollees are not generally informed about the financial 
arrangements between the HMOs and their physicians. See, e.g., Deven C. McGraw, Frrumcial Incentives to 
LimiJ Services: Should ~sician.s & Required to Disclose TMst To Palimt.s, 83 GEO. LJ. 1821, 1836. ("Although 
the patient is likely to know about the use of external controls on medical services like utilization review, 
most HMO enrollees are unaware of how their providers are reimbursed." (citing ClARK C. HAVIGHURST, 
HEALTH CARE CHOICES: PRIVATE CONTRACTS As INSTRUMENTS OF HEALTH REFoRM 122 (1995))). 
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patient's attorney discovers the financial relationship between the physician 
and the payer, the patient will feel betrayed.8 Even if a medical disaster does 
not occur, a patient apprised of the financial incentives to limit unnecessary 
care may become distrustful of the physician'sjudgment.9 Thus, by means of 
"Machiavellian" 10 financial techniques, insurance companies may have 
"managed" care by depriving Americans of a luxury they previously enjoyed: 
the luxury of believing that you could trust your physician. 11 
At the tum of the century, there was a doctrine that operated as a guardian 
against the imposition of lay control over the physician-patient relationship. 
This doctrine is commonly referred to as the prohibition on the corporate 
practice of medicine. 12 When the doctrine was viable it had two major 
features: (1) physicians could not be employees of lay organizations, and (2) 
physicians were prohibited from sharing their fees with lay persons. 13 The 
articulated rationale behind the rule was that it was necessary in order to 
prevent lay profit motives from "corrupting medical judgment."'~ The 
8. See, e.g., David R. Olmos, Cutting Medical Costs-Or COTTID's?, L.A. TIMES, May 5, 1995, at AI 
(describing lawsuit by deceased patient's husband wherein it is contended that financial incentives caused 
his wife's death). 
9. See David Mechanic & Mark Schlesinger, The Impact tif Managed Care on PatienJ's Trust in Medical 
Care and Their Pf!)lsicians, 27 5 JAMA 1693, 1694 (1996) (noting that disclosure of information about financial 
incentives to limit care seems more likely to elicit distrust than trust). 
10. Machiavelli was a sixteenth century political theorist who posited that politics is amoral and that 
any means, however unscrupulous, can justifiably be used in achieving political power. See MERRIAM 
WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (lOth ed. 1994). The term "Machiavellian" is used to suggest 
conduct that is marked by cunning, duplicity, or bad faith . See id. This phrase was used by the district court 
in Garcia v. Texas Stak Board tifMedical Examiners to describe the perils that the court believed were inherent 
in allowing lay influence over physicians by overturning the corporate practice doctrine. 384 F. Supp. 434 
(W.D. Tex. 1974). It is the premise of this Article that the abandonment of the doctrine has created an 
environment in which the financing of health care is accomplished by techniques marked by cunning, 
duplicity, or bad faith. Hence the use of the term "Machiavellian." 
II. See Mechanic & Schlesinger, supra note 9, at 1643 (noting that patients' trust in physicians is 
threatened by the growth of managed care). 
12. See PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE 204 (1982) (noting 
that between 1905 and 1917, courts in several states ruled that corporations could not engage in the 
commercial practice of ~edicine); Mark Hall, The Corporate Practice tif Medicine, in HEALTH CARE 
CORPORATE LAW 3-1 (Mark A. Hall &Justin G. Vaughan, eds., 1994) [hereinafter Hall, Corporate Practice] ; 
Jeffrey F. Chase-Lubitz, Comment, The Corporate Practice tif Medicine Doctrine: An Anachroni.!m in /he Modem 
Health Care Industry, 40 VAND. L. REV. 445 (1987); Mark A. Hall, Institutional Control tifl'f!)l.licimz Beluwior: 
Legal Barriers to Health Care Cost ContainrnmJ, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 431 (1988) [hereinafter Hall, Institutional 
Control] . 
13. See Hall, Corporate Practice, supra note 12, at 3-1 ("Corporate practice occurs when administrators 
hire doctors or when payment for medical services flows from the patient to the corporation before it goes 
to the doctors rather than in a one-to-one payment relationship between doctor and patient."); Chase-
Lubitz, supra note 12, at 44 7 ("Generally, courts hold that the doctrine prohibited corporations from 
practicing medicine through licensed employees or from realizing profits through the distribution of a 
physician's professional services."). 
14. Hall, Corporate Practice, supra note 12, at 3-12 ("Because employed physicians are subordinate to 
the corporation, they may be forced to sacrifice patient welfare for the corporation's profit- maximizing 
goals. Courts are naturally concerned that this conflict in loyalty would subvert quality of care."). 
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corporate practice doctrine has been credited with aiding the medical 
profession in its struggle for autonomy. 15 
Adherence to the corporate practice doctrine, however, would also inhibit 
physicians from engaging in price competition. 16 Policy-makers and 
commentators perceived that, therefore, the doctrine stood as an obstacle to 
·health care cost containment. 17 When the nation's health care policy began 
to focus on cost containment, the corporate practice doctrine fell into 
disfavor. 18 This Article argues that the current emphasis on health care cost 
containment requires that we resurrect the doctrine. 
The health care delivery system in America involves two primary functions 
that are inherently and naturally in conflict: the service delivery function and 
the financing function. The service delivery function is controlled by the 
physician who makes the decision to consume health care resources. 19 The 
financing function is performed by private and public payers of health care 
services. The two activities are inherently antagonistic. If the physician 
makes a decision that the patient needs a particular medical service, this 
decision results in a depletion of the financial resources. 
The fact that a physician's decision to provide medical care and the duty to 
finance those services are in conflict means that physicians and payers of 
health care services will have disputes over health care consumption. This is 
good because the dynamic ruling physicians' behavior tends to cause 
physicians to over-utilize health resources/0 and the dynamic ruling payers' 
behavior tends to leave some necessary health needs unmet. 21 It is 
15. See Chase-Lubitz, supra note 12, at 446-70. 
16. See iJ. at 476. 
17. See id. at 4 79 (noting that "in their efforts to provide medical services in a cost-conscious 
environment, corporations have introduced alternative systems of health care delivery that are inconsistent 
with the traditional norms of physician autonomy and that contravene the underpinnings of the corporate 
practice doctrine"). 
18. See in.fra notes 49-71 and accompanying text. 
19. See Elaine Lu, The Potential E.ffict of Managed C=petition in Health Care on Providrr Liahili!J & Patimt 
AuliJntJ"!)', 30 HAR.v.J. ON LEGIS. 519, 527 (1993) ("Though doctors receive only about twenty percent of 
each health care dollar, they influence seventy percent of total health care spending."). 
20. See Randall, supra note 14, at 15 (noting that traditional reimbursement method created 
"powerful incentives for all players in the health care system to intervene excessively with overpriced 
procedures" and that "[n)o one had an incentive to economize"); see also, Thomas Bodenheimer, 
Reimbursing Pf!ysicians and Hospitals, 272JAMA 971 , 972 (1994) ("Under fee for service reimbursement, 
physicians have an economic incentive to perform more services, since more services bring more fees."). 
21 . It is simply not feasible to cover all medically necessary services. Payers respond to this fact by 
rationing on a macro level by establishing budgets for health care expenditures or by excluding from 
coverage, or limiting coverage for, certain types of services that are medically necessary. For example, 
mental health coverage traditionally has been limited. This aspect of the policy to undercover health needs 
is described as inevitable. See, e.g., Leonard M. Fleck, Just Health Care RaiWning: A DemocraJic Deci.simunoking 
Apprvoch, 140U. PA. L. REV. 1597, 1603 (''There are limits to what we as a society ought to spend on health 
care because of other computing social goods that make legitimate claims on [a] finite set of dollars. Hence, 
the need for health rationing is inescapable."); see also, Mark A. Hall, RaJWning Health Care at tire Bed.side, 69 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 693,694 ("When we are ill, we desperately want our doctors to do everything within their 
power to heal us, regardless of the costs involved. Medical technology has advanced so far, however, that 
literal adherence to this credo for everyone would consume the entire gross domestic product."). 
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appropriate that disputes over the provision of medical services be explicit and 
that the resolution of such disputes be salient. Utilization review is the process 
by which a payer determines if medical services are appropriate and 
necessary.22 This may include requiring a physician to obtain approval from 
the payer before providing certain types of care, particularly, referrals to 
specialists or admissions to hospitals for in-patient treatment. This process can 
be highly contentious, but it is the type of salient process required to address 
disputes over treatment decisions. However, this process, because of its 
visibility, has fallen into disfavor as payers opt for more subtle means to 
contain health care costs. 
In the new health care environment, health care financing increasingly 
involves arrangements that shift some of the financial risk of health care 
expenditures from insurance companies and other payers of health care 
services to physicians and other providers.23 "Risk sharing," as these 
arrangements are known/4 imposes some of the financing function on 
physicians. It is the contention of this Article that risk sharing is either: (I) 
dangerous because it is designed to alter physician decision making, or (2) 
dishonest because it is merely a covert means to transfer the cost of providing 
health insurance coverage from insurers to physicians. 
Because of their training and expertise, physicians operate as fiduciaries. 25 
By imposing the financing function on physicians, risk-sharing arrangements 
potentially undermine the integrity of physicians' exercise of their fiduciary 
obligations to patients.26 Risk sharing presents the physician with a 
22. See in.fra note 84 and accompanying text. 
23. See, e.g., Alan L. Hillman, Fmancial /ncenti.ws fqr ~sicians in HMOs: Is There A Coriflict of InUres~ 
317 NEW ENG. j. MED. 1743 (1987). In this article, Dr. Hillman reported the results of a survey he 
conducted in 1987 in which he mailed a questionnaire to the 595 HMOs known to be in operation as of 
1986. See id. at 1744. Fifty-one percent of the HMOs responded. See it/. Of the respondents, forty-six 
percent paid their physicians pursuant to the capitation method. See id. at 1745 tbl.2. Sixty-six percent 
withheld some percentage of the physician's fees. See it/. at 1746 tbl.3 . Capitation and fee withholding are 
two mechanisms by which HMOs shift financial risk to physicians. See in.fra notes 102-14 and 
accompanying text; see also Randall, supra note 4, at 30-31 . 
24. See in.fra notes 102-14 and accompanying text. 
25. See Mary Anne Bobinski,Aulono179' and ltWocy: Prolecting PatienJ.r From Their ~sicians, 55 U. Prrr. 
L. REV. 291, 348-49. (1994) ("Fiduciary relationships are generally described as those in which some aspect 
of the relationship between parties justifies the imposition of special obligations on one of them. Several 
treatises on fiduciary law name the physician-patient relationship as a fiduciary one and the courts have 
tended to concur." (citing.J.C. SHEPHERD, THE LAW OF FIDUCIARIES, 29-4 (1981) and Thomas H. Boyd, 
Cost Conlainmmt and the ~sicitm's Fiduciary~ w the PaJimt, 39 DEPAULL. REv. 131, 135 (1989))). In at 
least one instance, this fiduciary relationship has been defined by statute. The Texas Commercial Bribery 
Act provides that a fiduciary commits a felony "if without the consent of his beneficiary, he intentionally 
or knowingly solicits, accepts, or agrees to accept any benefit from another person--on agreement or 
understanding that the benefit will influence the conduct of the fiduciary in relation to the affairs of his 
beneficiary." TEX. PENAL CODE§ 32.43(aX2Xc) (West 1994). The Texas Commercial Bribery Act defines 
the term "fiduciary" to include a physician. /d. 
26. Much has been written on the conflict of interest inherent in risk sharing arrangements. See, 
e.g., MARC A RODWIN, MEDICINE, MONEY AND MORALS: PHYSICIANS' CONFUCTS OF INTEREST 136 
(1993). 
Paying physicians to act as cost-control agents for third parties pits the interests of physicians 
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choice-deny care or subsidize the cost of that care. Reassertion of the 
corporate practice doctrine would restore the separation of the service delivery 
function and the financing function. 
Even if risk sharing does not alter physician conduct, it does allow insurance 
companies to export some of the cost of doing business to physicians. Because 
the risk-sharing arrangements that are prevalent are designed to reward and 
punish aggregate behavior, the actions of an individual physician do not have 
an effect on the physician's finances. 27 The individual physician remains 
powerless to influence the impact of the risk-sharing arrangement. To the 
extent that risk sharing shifts costs to physicians, the practice allows insurance 
payers to operate as beneficiaries of a hidden subsidy, as a portion of its costs 
are underwritten by the medical profession. In this sense, risk sharing is 
dishonest. 
Risk sharing also creates an additional hidden subsidy for the insurance 
industry by allowing payers to distance themselves from explicit rationing 
decisions. Risk sharing, in effect, balances the cost containment agenda on the 
backs of American physicians.28 This is done by making the physician the 
payers' de facto health care rationing agent. 29 Therefore, risk sharing masks 
the hidden psychic, as well as financial, costs associated with private sector 
health care financing. 
Unfortunately, the federal government has become a willing participant in 
the risk-sharing strategy. The federal government has undermined the 
corporate practice doctrine30 and has adopted risk-sharing strategies of its 
own.31 The federal government needs to embrace the prohibition on the 
corporate practice of medicine in order to prevent insurance companies from 
/d. 
against those of patients. It motivates physicians to consider their own financial interests in 
balancing the concerns of payers and patients. And it compromises the ability of physicians 
to offer patients disinterested professional advice. 
27. See in.fra notes 130-35 and accompanying text. 
28. See Hall, supra note 21, at 716. In his article, which supports some degree of health care 
rationing by physicians, Hall states: 
/d. 
The alternatives to internalizing cost constraints in physician's clinical judgments are either 
to force patients to make their trade-offs themselves by preventing them from purchasing 
insurance or to allow private insurers and employers, driven by profit-making concerns, or 
government, driven by budget-deficit concerns, to impute cost constraints explicitly by rule 
based oversight of medical practice. 
29. /d. 
30. See in.fra notes 62-71 and accompanying text describing impact ofFcderal HMO Act of 1974 and 
Federal Trade Commission Antitrust enforcement on corporate practice of medicine doctrine. 
31. The federal government is the payer under two federal programs for health services: Medicare 
and Medicaid. Under each of these programs, HMOs may contract with the federal or state government 
to accept payment on a prospective basis, rather than a fee-for-service basis. Enrollment in Medicare 
HMOs has increased from 400,000 in 1980 to 2.9 million in 1995 (from 4.3% of total HMO enrollment 
to 8%). See U.S. DEP'TOFHEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, supra note 4, at 262, tbl.136. Enrollment in 
Medicaid HMOs rose to 3.3 million in 1995. See id. 
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shifting the financing function to physicians. Only then can we reveal the true 
costs of maintaining the system of private health insurance. 
Part II of this Article will examine the premises underlying the corporate 
practice of medicine doctrine. This Part will reveal that the doctrine resulted 
from a mixture of protectionist motives on the part of organized medicine and 
an idealized conception of the physician-patient relationship by the courts. 
Part III will examine how federal policy helped lead to the demise of the 
doctrine. This Part will reveal that the federal government was more 
concerned about cost containment than with preserving an idealized 
physician-patient relationship. Part IV will describe the financial risk-shifting 
mechanisms that have arisen in response to the need to control health care 
costs. Part V will explain how risk sharing is either dangerous because of its 
potential to alter the physician-patient relationship, or dishonest because it 
merely allows private sector payers to benefit from a hidden public subsidy. 
Part VI will examine how a healthy respect for the rationales underlying the 
corporate practice doctrine would lead to a prohibition on risk-sharing 
arrangements. Part V1I then describes the inadequate federal response to risk-
sharing arrangements. Finally, Part VIII describes why the danger and 
dishonesty of risk sharing cannot be ameliorated by any means other than a 
blanket prohibition on the practice. 
II. WHEN TITANS CLASH, ROUND ONE: THE CORPORATE 
PRACTICE DOCTRINE VS. COST CONTAINMENT 
On July 30, 1972, a group of individuals from San Antonio, Texas 
attempted to file articles of incorporation with the Texas Secretary of State for 
the purpose of incorporating a nonprofit corporation known as the San 
Antonio Community Health Maintenance Association (SACMHA).32 These 
individuals intended to use SACMHA to provide medical and health care 
programs to Mexican-American and black communities and other low-income 
groups in Bexar County, Texas.33 The Articles oflncorporation envisioned 
that SACMHA would be empowered to "contract for the employment of 
licensed physicians on a salary basis to work for [SACMHA] as employees."34 
The problem with the proposal to hire physicians as employees on a salary 
basis was that none of the incorporators were licensed physicians. Therefore, 
SACMHA's Articles of Incorporation were in conflict with Texas statutes 
that, as interpreted by Texas courts, prohibited the corporate practice of 
medicine, which included a prohibition on employing physicians on a salary 
basis.35 
The Texas Secretary of State refused to grant a charter for SACMHA. The 
incorporators brought suit in federal court alleging that the state's prohibition 
32. See Garcia v. Texas State Bd. ofMed . Exam'rs, 384 F. Supp. 434, 435 (W.D. Tex. 1974). 
33 . &e ui. 
34. /d. 
35. See id. 
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on the corporate practice of medicine violated their right to equal protection 
under the Fourteenth Amendment and their freedom of association under the 
First Amendment.36 Whil :=recognizing the need for low cost medical services, 
which the plaintiffs were <.ttempting to address by incorporating SACMHA,37 
the district court upheld tne prohibition on the corporate practice of medicine 
in Garcia v. Texas State Board of Medical Examiners.38 
In rejecting the plaintiffs' claims, the court relied on various theories that 
courts had traditionally used to articulate and enforce the prohibition on the 
corporate practice of medicine. The court stated "' [t]o practice a profession 
requires something more than the financial ability to hire competent persons 
to do the actual work. It can be done only by duly qualified human being, and 
to qualifY something more than mere knowledge or skill is essential . . . No 
corporation can qualify."'39 
Garcia's reasoning echoed a branch of cases which held that the prohibition 
on the corporate practice of medicine was supported by state licensing statutes 
that required a license to practice medicine. The reasoning was that 
" [ c] orporations cannot possibly qualifY for a medical license because the 
applicant must demonstrate moral character and professional competence. 
Corporations, of course, do not have a moral character, cannot attend medical 
school, and cannot be tested."40 Therefore, corporations could n<?t obtain a 
license to practice medicine. The court reasoned that because corporations 
could not practice medicine directly, they also could not do so indirectly by 
employing licensed physicians.41 
This reasoning is rather tenuous. The argument that a corporation cannot 
practice medicine because it cannot obtain a license is like saying that a 
corporation cannot engage in trucking because a corporation cannot obtain 
a driver's license.42 The argument that a corporation cannot practice 
36. See id. 
3 7. See id. at 439-40 (noting a "grave shortage of doctors" and a need for "more medical care at a 
less expensive cost"). 
38. /d. at 440. 
39. /d. at 438 (quoting Dr. Allison, .DenJi.st v. Allison, 360 Ill. 638, 196 N.E. 799 (1935)) (alteration in 
original). 
40. Hall, lnstiJutiDnal Control, supra note 12, at 512; see also, Chase-Lubitz, supra note 12, at 465 
(noting that "[c]ourts that derive a rule against corporate practice from statute requiring license hold that 
a corporation's non-personal nature prevents it from meeting the qualifications of the licensure statute and 
therefore prevents it from practicing medicine"). 
41. See Hall, Curporate Practice, supra note 12, at 3-10 (noting that such courts reason that corporations 
which employ physicians violated licensing laws by reason of the agency law notion that acts of the 
employees are attributable to the employer). 
42. Id. at 3-20. Hall concludes that there is not really a sound statutory basis for the corporate 
practice doctrine. Few statutes specifically address the issue, and courts have pieced together an implication 
based on reasoning that Hall characterizes as either formalistic or obvious sophistry. To emphasize his 
point, Hall observes: 
The argument is no more sound than the argument, say, that corporations who hire truck 
drivers are engaged in driving without a license because: 
The actions of drivers hired by a corporation are attributed to the corporation; 
an eyesight examination is required for a driver's license; 
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medicine bec~use it cannot obtain a license represents a judicial attempt to 
avoid makiP5 public policy.43 It reflects one line of reasoning that courts used 
in the corporate practice cases-a somewhat tortured reading of a licensing 
law to achieve the court's rather thinly veiled public policy agenda.44 
The Garcia court also noted that "[t]he Texas legislature seeks to preserve 
the vitally important doctor-patient relationship, and prevent possible abuses 
resulting from lay person control of a corporation employing licensed 
physicians on a salaried basis."45 The court reflected: · 
While it is no doubt true that this nation faces a grave shortage of 
doctors, is the panacea to be found in the formation of non-profit 
layman corporations? We think not. It appears to the Court that not 
only is such a corporation fraught with practical and ethical 
considerations, but may well represent a backward step in the 
legislative protections it has taken so long to achieve. Without 
licensed, professional doctors on Boards of Directors, who and what 
criteria govern the selection of medical and paramedical staff 
members? To whom does the doctor owe his first duty-the patient 
or corporation? . . . Who is to dictate the medical and administrative 
procedures to be followed? Where do budget considerations end and 
patient care begin?46 
These statements underscore the public policy concerns that courts 
have used to support the prohibition on the corporate practice of 
medicine. Lay control over the physician's professional judgment, 
commercial exploitation of the medical practice, and division of the 
physician's loyalty between patient and employer are rationales that 
courts have advanced to prohibit the corporate practice ofmedicine.47 
Implicit in these public policy concerns was a belief that the profit 
motives of lay persons should not interfere with the sanctity of the 
physician-patient relationship. As one commentator noted: 
The fidelity of the physician-patient relationship has long been viewed 
as crucial to the practice of medicine. The introduction of a third 
party into that relationship could divert the physician's loyalty from 
the patient to the third party compensating the physician. 
Consequently, the physician might be more concerned with the 
corporations cannot take an eye exam; 
therefore, a corporation that hires drivers is guilty of driving without a license. 
Id. at 3-2D-3-21 . 
43 . Id. 
44. Id. 
45. Garcia v. Texas State Bd. Med. ofExam'rs, 384 F. Supp. 434, 438-39 (W.D. Tex. 1974). 
46. Id. at 439-40. 
4 7. Ste Chase-Lubitz, supra note 12, at 467. 
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interests of the corporation's investors than with the interests of the 
physician's patient.48 
Thus, the court's opinion in Garcia relied upon the traditional grounds 
upon which the judiciary had supported (and created) the prohibition on 
the corporate practice of medicine. Garcia is instructive because it 
involves the application of the doctrine in the context of the modern 
concern with health care cost containment. In Garcia, the court's 
upholding the doctrine had the effect of preventing the implementation 
of an innovative health care delivery system that would both contain 
health care cost and expand accessibility of services. It was the fact that 
the doctrine presented an obstacle to such cost containment measures 
that hastened its demise. 
Ill. WHEN TITANS CLASH, ROUND Two: THE CORPORATE 
PRACTICE DOCTRINE VS. THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 
The corporate practice of medicine doctrine was a creature of the 
organized medical profession, state legislatures, and the courts. 49 The 
doctrine is credited with helping to raise the standards of the medical 
profession and protecting the public from quackery. 50 It is credited with 
doing much to establish the sovereignty of physicians. 51 However, 
viewed in another light, the doctrine was foisted upon the unsuspecting 
public by organized medicine to preserve physicians' financial well-
being by protecting physicians from competition. 52 When the 
protectionist aspects of the corporate practice of medicine doctrine came 
into conflict with the federal concern about the increasing cost of 
medical services, the federal government responded by undermining the 
doctrine. 
The prohibition on the corporate practice of medicine found its 
genesis in ethical codes of organized medicine. The ethical code was 
48. ld. at 470. 
49. See generally id. at 445. 
50. Su Garcia, at 437-38. ("Historically, such remedial statutes have been adopted as a result of 
hindsight and in the wake of a stream of public abuse at the hands of entrepreneur medicine man purveying 
his snake oil elixir."). 
51. See STARR, supra note 12, at 199-232. This section describes the organized medical profession's 
resistance of corporate control between 1900 and 1920. This resistance contributed to maintaining the 
professional sovereignty of physicians. 
52. Chase-Lubitz, supra note 12, at 457-58 (noting that "contract practice" and "corporate practice" 
threatened organized medicine's monopolistic designs by creating competition); su also STARR, supra note 
12, at 215-16 ("Doctors opposed corporate enterprise in medical practice not only because they wanted 
to preserve their autonomy, but also because they wanted to prevent the emergence of any intermediary 
or third party that might keep for itself the profits potentially available to the practice of medicine."). 
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part of organized medicine's early effort to "establish the preeminence 
of the regular medical profession in the provision of health care by 
imposing higher standards on the profession and by distinguishing it 
from sectarianism and quackery. "53 The young profession was aided in 
this endeavor by state legislatures that adopted licensing statutes which 
prohibited the practice of medicine without obtaining a medical license, 
and judicial interpretations of such statutes. 54 
As part of the effort to distinguish physicians from pretenders, the 
ethical code promulgated by the American Medical Association (AMA) 
consistently and jealously guarded against inroads into physicians' 
autonomy. The AMA's ethical codes initially prohibited physicians 
from engaging in financial arrangements that made it "impossible to 
render adequate service" and that "interfere[d) with reasonable 
competition among the physicians of a community."55 The AMA 
revised its ethical code in 1934 by the addition of the following 
proscription: 
It is unprofessional for a physician to dispose of his professional 
attainments or services to any lay body, organization, group or 
individual, by whatever name called, or however organized, under 
terms or conditions which permit a direct profit from the fees, salary 
or compensation received to accrue to the lay body or individual 
employing him. Such a procedure is beneath the dignity of 
professional practice, is unfair competition with the profession at 
large, is harmful alike to the profession of medicine and the welfare of 
the people, and is against sound public policy. 56 
In other words, the ethical code prevented physicians from taking 
salaried positions with lay organizations or splitting professional fees 
with lay organizations. 57 
As one commentator noted: 
Through the development and enforcement of an ethical code, the 
AMA was able to organize regular physicians and distinguish them 
from less reputable practitioners. By procuring passage of licensing 
legislation, the regular medical profession began to limit competition 
and raise the quality of practitioners. With successes in educational 
reform, the AMA further controlled competition and advanced 
physicians' expertise. By the early twentieth century, the AMA 
brought public respect and greater financial reward to physicians and 
53. Chase-Lubitz, supra note 12, at 449. 
54. See id. at 464-69. 
55. Id. at 459 (quoting In re AMA, 94 F.T .C. 701, 1011 n.59). 
56. Id. at 462 n.113. 
57. See id. at 462-63. 
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established the regular medical profession's virtual control over 
medical care.58 
As noted above, the AMA, the state legislatures, and the courts 
created and maintained the prohibition on the corporate practice of 
medicine. The federal government was not concerned about the 
manner in which medical services were organized and delivered until 
the 1960s. Prior to that point, the federal government was not 
significantly involved in health care, either through the licensing of 
providers or through regulation. 59 This changed in 1965 with the 
introduction of the Medicare program. 60 With the introduction of the 
Medicare program, the federal government became significantly 
involved in health care as the major purchaser of health care services.61 
As a major purchaser of health services, the federal government 
quickly became concerned about the cost of those services. This 
concern signaled the beginning of the end of the prohibition on the 
corporate practice of medicine. Two federal responses to health care 
cost containment undermined the continuing viability of the prohibition 
on the corporate practice of medicine. These were actions by the 
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) in its enforcement of antitrust laws 
and the enactment of the Federal HMO Act. 
The FTC determined that the AMA's promulgation of ethical 
opinions concerning the corporate practice of medicine constituted 
anticompetitive conduct by the profession.62 It enjoined the AMA from 
the publication and dissemination of ethical codes that proscribed 
58. /d. at 455 (footnote omitted). 
59. Federal involvement in health care expenditures began in the 1930s with the introduction of 
legislation to provide medical services for recipients of the Federal Emergency Relief Administration. Title 
V of the Social Security Act of 1935 provided grants to states, for maternal and child health programs, and 
Title VI authorized grants to assist state and other political subdivisions "in establishing and maintaining 
adequate public health services." WILLIAM L KISSICK, MEDICINE'S DILEMMAS 77 ( 1994). The Hospital 
Survey and Construction Act of 1946, known as the Hill-Burton program, directed funds towards the 
development of hospitals, public health centers, and other facilities . See iJ. at 78-79. The government 
supported research via the establishment of the National Institute of Health and the National Cancer 
Institute in 1937, the National Heart Institute in 1948, and the National Institute of Mental Health in 
1949. See iJ. at 78. In 1956, Congress authorized support for the training of public health personnel for 
programs established under Title VI of the Social Security Act. See iJ. at 79. 
60. See Title XVII of the Social Security Act, Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79 Stat. 286 (1965) (codified as 
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§1395-96). 
61. With the advent of Medicare and Medicaid, federal expenditures for health care rose from S9.5 
billion in 1965 to S41.5 billion in 1975. See Sven Steinmo &Jon Watts, /Lr 11re /nstiJutWns, Stupid! Wl9' 
CtmiJ1rt}rm.sWeNalimuJJ Hea/JhlnsuranceA!ztx!Js Fails in America, 20]. HEAL Til PoL. PoL'Y AND L 329, 357 n.20 
(1995). By 1993, this figure had risen to S281 billion, or 32% of the total S884 billion spent on health care. 
See U .S. DEP'TOFHEALTIIAND HUMAN SERVICES, supra note 4, at 31. 
62. See In u AMA, 94 F.T .C . 701 (1979). 
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physicians from entering into various types of financial arrangements. 63 
This would remove an effective method for enforcing the prohibition on 
the corporate practice of medicine. 64 
The AMA's ethical codes were an effective means of enforcing the 
prohibition on the corporate practice of medicine.65 However, the 
ethical codes never had the force of law. Notwithstanding the FTC 
action, legislation and judicial opinions still remained as obstacles to the 
employment of physicians by corporations.66 In 1973, Congress 
removed some of these obstacles by passing the Federal HMO Act.67 
The purpose of the Act was to promote the development ofHMOs as 
a means for controlling health care costs and increasing access to health 
care.68 The legislation preempts state laws requiring that all of the 
board of directors of an HMO be physicians.69 
These two federal actions hastened the demise of the corporate 
practice doctrine. 70 Legal commentators have applauded this action 
because the doctrine stood as an obstacle to the development of 
innovative health care delivery systems needed to control health care 
costs and increase access to care.71 Unfortunately, dismantling the 
doctrine also contributed to the development of subtle (Machiavellian?) 
disruptions in the physician-patient relationship. 
IV. RISK SHARING: A HEALTH CARE FINANCING INNOVATION 
As cost containment came to the foreground as a predominant issue 
in health care, innovative strategies arose for dealing with the cost of 
health care. 72 Physicians were key actors in the health care delivery 
system and were identified as the prime actors in the decision to 
63. Suid. 
64. See Chase-Lubitz, supra note 12, at 458-64 (relating to the role of the American Medical 
Association (AMA) ethical pronouncements of enforcement of corporate practice doctrine). 
65. Suid. 
66. Suid. at 464-67 (Indicating role of state licensing laws statutes and judicial interpretation of those 
laws.) 
67. Health Maintenance Organization Act of1973, Pub. L. No. 93-100 (codified as amended at 42 
U.S.C. § 300e. (1996)). 
68. SeeS. REP. 93-1279 (1973), rtprinled in 1973 U.S.C.C.A.N 3033. 
69. 42 U.S.C. § 300e-10(a)( I)(B) (1996). 
70. See Chase-Lubitz, supra note 12, at 478 ("[f) he recent abolition of these ethical restrictions (by 
the Federal Trade Commission (FfC)] greatly weakens the foundation upon which the corporate practice 
of medicine doctrine was built.") and 482 ("[f) he HMO legislation implicitly preempts the common law 
prohibition . . . and is a sweeping federal policy statement in favor of a corporate-based competitive health 
market. The legislation eschews a medical economy dominated by independent, fee-for-service 
practitioners."). 
71. See id. at 488. 
72 . See infra notes 84-117 and accompanying text. 
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consume health care resources. 73 Therefore, many of the cost 
containment strategies were aimed at controlling physicians' behavior.74 
As the payers sought more effective methods to contain costs, they 
adopted strategies that became more and more intrusive into the 
physician-patient relationship. This moved the physician-patient 
relationship further away from the relationship idealized by courts that 
espoused enforcement of the prohibition on the corporate practice of 
medicine. These courts had envisioned that the physician-patient 
relationship was a fiduciary relationship which should not be 
encumbered by lay profit motives. Eventually, the payers achieved the 
ultimate coup by realigning the physicians' financial interest to coincide 
with the payers' financial interests. The payers accomplished this 
fundamental realignment by risk sharing. 75 Risk sharing involves 
shifting some of the cost of providing health care from the payers to the 
physicians. 76 
The cost of medical services increased at an alarming rate between 
19 7 0 through the early 1990s. 77 Medical inflation generally outstripped 
the general inflation rate and health care consumed a greater and 
greater portion of the gross national product. 78 One theory explaining 
Id. 
73 . See Lu, supra note 19, at 528; su also in.fra notes 82-117 and accompanying text. 
74. See in.fra notes 82-117 and accompanying text. 
75. See RODWIN, supra note 26, at 139-40. Rodwin notes: 
Most HMOs ... use payment incentives to tie the interests of physicians to the financial 
goals of the organization. They frequently make physicians-particularly primary care 
physicians- bear part of the financial risk for providing services, so that their incomes 
decrease as the cost of treating patients rises. 
76. See id. 
77. Between 1970 and 1994 the total expenditures for health care rose from S73.2 billion to S949.4 
billion. U .S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICF.'i, supra note 4, at 239, tbl.ll4. This represents 
more than a twelve-fold increase. By comparison, the increase for total gross domestic product was only 
seven-fold from S I ,035.6 billion to $6,931.3 billion. See id. 
7 8. The average general inflation index and medical inflation index between 1970 and 1994 was: 
All Items Medical Care 
1970-1975 6.8 6.9 
1975-1980 8.9 9.5 
1980-1985 5.5 8.7 
1985-1990 4.0 7.5 
1990-1995 3.1 6.3 
Id. at 241, tbl.ll6. 
The percentage of the gross national product (GNP) represented by expenditures for medical services 
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the persistence of increasing health care expenditures was that it resulted 
from the system for financing health care. Health insurance reimbursed 
health care providers for services on the basis of retrospective cost. 79 
After the provision of the services, the provider would submit a bill to 
the insurance company, and if the bill did not appear to be out ofline 
with industry norms, the insurance company paid the bill. There was 
no requirement for advance pricing or advance approval for most 
medical procedures, including high cost in-patient hospital services.80 
In this system, the physician directed the consumption of health care 
resources without external limitations. The patient was not concerned 
about the costs because the insurer made the payments. The insurer 
was not concerned with the cost because it would be able to pass the cost 
along in the form of higher premiums paid by the employers. 
Therefore, the bills were passed along through the system and no one 
had an interest in containing health care delivery costs.81 
The physician reigned supreme in this system. The physician alone 
had the expertise necessary to determine what medical treatment a 
patient required. It was, therefore, the physicians who directed the 
consumption of health care resources. 82 The physicians' financial 
interest under the fee-for-service system was aligned with more, rather 
than less, consumption of medical resources. 83 The more services that 
the physician determined the patient needed, the more the patient 
received and the more the physician was paid. 
Recognizing the physicians' role in health care consumption 
decisions, the insurance industry and the payers adopted cost 
containment strategies aimed at the physicians' decision-making. These 
strategies, known as managed care, included utilization review-
requirements that the physicians desiring to conduct a test or provide a 
procedure needed to obtain preapproval from the payer.84 Utilization 
rose from 7.1% in 1970 to 13.7% in 1994. /d. at 241, tbl.ll4. By comparison, in 1993 when U.S. 
expenditures for medical care represented 13.6% of the GNP, the percentage of the GNP spent on medical 
care in other developed countries was as follows: Canada (10.2%), France (9.8%), Germany (8.6%), Japan 
(7 .3%), and the United Kingdom (7 . I%). Set id. at 240, tbi.IIS. It is also clear that expenditures per capita 
in the U .S. exceed those of other nations. Set iJ. In 1993 the U .S. spent $3,331 per capita, while other 
developed countries' spending was as follows: Canada (S l ,971), France (S I ,835), Germany (S I ,815),Japan 
($1,495), United Kingdom (Sl,213). SuiJ. 
79. Set Randall, supra note 4, at 14-15. 
80. Set general!J iJ. at 15-16. 
81 . Set id. at IS & n.SO; see also Gregg Easterbrook, The Revolution in Medicine Can, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 
26, 1987, at 43 (describing the "pass along" feature of health care financing). 
82. Set Lu, supra note 19, at 528. 
83. Set Randall, supra note 4, at 15; Bodenheimer, supra note 20, at 972. 
84. Set Mary R. Kohler, J1.7ltn the J.t?wle Ete«ds the Sum oflts Parts: W1!7 &isting Utili.tation Management 
Practices Don't Measure Up, 53 U . PnT. L. REV. 1061, 1062-63 (1992). 
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review included preadmission review or precertification for inpatient 
hospital services or diagnostic testsl85 concurrent review,86 and required 
second opinion for elective surgical procedures87 and gatekeepers. 88 
In addition, insurers and payers also introduced alternative 
arrangements for health care delivery. The most traditional was the 
HM0.89 HMOs are distinguished from traditional insurance in that 
they represent a combination of the insurance function with the service 
provider function. HMOs collect premiums and arrange for the 
provision of health care services by employing or contracting with 
physicians.90 HMOs attempt to address the cost ofhealth care by: (1) 
emphasizing preventative care, (2) extensive utilization management, 
and (3) alternative fee structures with physicians. 91 An additional form 
of managed care is the preferred provider organization (PP0).92 Under 
a PPO arrangement, a select group of physicians contracts to provide 
medical services to patients at discounted fees. 93 The PPO also typically 
combines some form of utilization management in order to control the 
consumption of heaith care resources. 94 
Utilization management proved to be an unsatisfactory method of 
controlling health care expenditures. It added an additional layer of 
bureaucracy to the health care delivery system.95 It did not actually save 
any money. 96 Also, physicians purportedly hated utilization review 
85. S« id. at 1070. Preadmission certification occurs prior to a patient's admission to the hospital 
for nonemergency treatment. 
86. Su id. Concurrent review occurs while the patient is still in the hospital. Under concurrent 
review, the payer determines the patient's need for continuing hospital in-patient services. 
87. Su Randall, supra note 4, at 28. 
88. Su id. 
89. S« Diana joseph Bearden & Bryan]. Maedgen, Emerging Theories of l..UJhiJi!y in lk Managed Heallh 
Carr.lndustty, 47 BAYLORL REV. 285, 291 (1995). In this article, the authors note that the term "HMO" 
was coined in the 1970s but the concept was created in the 1920s. They also describe the establishment 
ofKaiser-Permenente in the mid-1930s. S« id. Kaiser was established to provide for the health care needs 
of Kaiser employees who worked on the Grande Coulee Dam in Washington State. Su id. As of 1996, 
Kaiser was still in operation and listed as one of the nation's 43 largest HMOs with membership of 
approximately 3.5 million in Hawaii, California, Georgia, Ohio, the mid-Adantic, and the Northwest. Su 
Ellyn Spragins, Does rour HMO Stock Up?, NEWSWEEK, june 24, 1996, at 61-62 (survey rating 43 of 
America's largest HMOs). Kaiser represents a traditional HMO in that it both owns hospitals and employs 
the physicians who serve its patients. S« RODWIN, supra note 26, at 138 (''The first HMOs, now called staff 
mJHlel HMOs, owned medical care facilities and employed a group of physicians on salary."). 
90. Su Randall, supra note 4, at 20 & n.73. 
91 . Su Bearden & Maedgen, supra note 89, at 294-95. 
92. S« Bodenheimer, supra note 20, at 971. 
93. S« id. 
94. S« id. 
95. S« id. 
96. See, e.g., Kohler, supra note 84, at 1103 (Indicating that although some researchers report a 
potential saving of six percent per employee, other researchers criticize the methodologies of such studies); 
see also An HMOs the .Atuw!T?, CONSUMER REPoRTS, Aug. 1992, at 519, 520 (noting that calculation of cost 
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because it represented an intrusion into their professional autonomy. 97 
Because of these concerns, utilization review has been criticized as an 
ineffective means to limit medically unnecessary services. 98 
In order to effectively address the cost problem, the payers needed to 
co-opt physicians. 99 The payers could achieve this by shifting some of 
the financial risk for the cost of health care onto the physicians. Because 
physicians made the decisions regarding consumption of health care 
services, if the decision to consume would have a negative financial 
consequence for the physician, perhaps the physician would consume 
fewer services by ordering fewer diagnostic tests and not referring the 
patient for in-patient services. 100 As one commentator observes: 
[I]he control strategy that will work best is to influence physicians to 
change their practice styles, to acquire a new treatment philosophy, 
through a motivational force that orients them toward a more 
conservative end of the acceptable range of variation in medical 
practice. . . . The most effective motivational force is likely to be 
financial incentive. Iffee-for-service or cost-based reimbursement is 
seen as the source of health care's excess, reversing financial incentives 
to reward physicians for less rather than more treatment can be 
expected to change practice styles across the board. 101 
Risk sharing appears in two forms: ( 1) payment on the basis of 
capitation, 102 and (2) fee withholding. 103 Payers may use these forms of 
risk sharing separately or in combination with one another. 104 Under 
capitation reimbursement, in lieu of receiving a payment for each 
encounter with a patient, the physician receives a flat monthly payment 
per each patient assigned to the physician's care. 105 The payment is the 
savings from utilization may be overstated due to method of calculating the savings and that administrative 
costs associated with utilization review may further detract from the savings); THOMAS M. BURTON, &cond 
Opinwn: Finns That Promise Lower Medical Bills May Increase Them, WAIL ST.]., July 28, 1992, at AI (noting 
that review by Inspector General of the U.S. Health & Human Services Department concluded that the 
government had paid 513.3 million to utilization review companies to save $1.4 million in possibly 
unnecessary surgery). 
97. See Kohler, supra note 84, at 1077 ("Physicians are generally the most adamant opponents of 
concurrent review. They argue that it interferes with their clinical decisions, and places them in a tenuous 
position."). 
98. &c generaJ!y id. 
99. See Hall, lnstitutinnal Control, supra note 12, at 482-83. 
100. See id. 
I 0 I . ld. Hall notes that in Great Britain, physicians adopt a far less aggressive style of medicine due 
to severe resource constraints. See id. 
102. See Randall, supra note 4, at 30. 
103. See id. 
104. See, e.g., Hillman, supra note 23, at 1745 (noting that 67% of surveyed HMOs combined 
capitation and withholding). 
105. Set MARK V. PAULEY ET AL., PAYING PHYSICIANS: OPTIONS FOR CONTROlliNG COST, 
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same regardless of how often or whether the patient utilizes the 
physician's setvicesduring the month. Therefore, the physician is at risk 
that patients' demand for setvices may exceed the fee-for-setvice value 
of the setvices. The demand may require the physician to expand the 
pQ.ysician's office hours or add additional staff. 106 
Under fee withholding, the payer withholds a percentage of the 
physician's compensation (either the fee for setvices or the capitation 
payments). The payer distributes the withheld fees to the physician at 
the end of a specified period of time if the physician's performance 
meets certain criteria which the payer establishes. The performance 
criteria are typically related to the costs for expensive medical treatment, 
in particular, expenditures for referrals to specialists and expenditures 
for in-patient hospital treatment. 107 
For example, the payer may withhold twenty percent of the 
physician's fees earned during a month. The payer will allocate the 
withheld fees to a referral- and hospital-setvices risk pool. 108 The payer 
allocates funds for referral setvices and hospital setvices in accordance 
with a budget for such setvices. 109 The payer determines the risk pool 
budgets by using actuarial data that indicate the average cost for such 
services. 110 The payer pays for such setvices from the referral- and 
hospital-setvices risk pool. 111 If the payer's actual expenditures exceed 
the budget for such setvices, the payer applies the physician's withheld 
fees to the payment of the referral setvices and in-patient hospital 
services. 11 2 The physicians forfeit the withheld fees. 113 If the payer 
actually expends less than the budgeted amounts, the physicians. will be 
en tided to recoup some or all of their withheld fees. 114 In effect, the fee 
withholding places a designated percentage of the physician's income at 
risk for health care setvices that are not provided by the physician. The 
more services the physicians utilize, the less likely the physicians will 
recoup the withheld fees. 
Risk sharing has become increasingly popular as a health care cost-
containment mechanism. 115 It is the financing mechanism of choice in 
VOLUME,ANDlNTENSJ1YOFSERVICES 101 (1992). 
I 06. Sa Bodenheimer, supra note 20, at 973 (describing how under a system of capitation in which 
physicians are only responsible for their own services, it is only physicians' time that is at risk). 
107. Sa, e.g., Hillman, supra note 23, at 1744. 
108. Said. 
109. Said. 
110. Said. 
Ill. Said. 
112. Said. 
113. Sa iJ. 
114. Said. 
115. See, e.g., Alan L Hillman, eta!., HMO Managers views on Financial Incentives & Q!ta/i!)l, 10 HEALTII 
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so-called mature managed care markets. 116 Although originally a 
creature of the private sector, risk sharing has also begun to take hold in 
the federal programs, Medicare and Medicaid, albeit in an indirect 
fashion. 117 
Risk sharing would not have withstood a challenge based on the 
prohibition on the corporate practice of medicine. Risk sharing violates 
the corporate practice doctrine's prohibition on physicians sharing their 
fees with lay persons. Under capitation, the physician no longer sets a 
fee. The managed care organization establishes the fee. Under 
withholding, the managed care entity retains physicians' fees for 
application against its own costs. These arrangements would violate the 
corporate practice doctrine on their face. Further, it would not be 
difficult for a court to articulate how these practices also violate the 
principles inherent in the corporate practice doctrine-division of 
loyalty, exploitation of medicine, and physician autonomy. 118 
AFF. 207, 208 (1991) ("Approximately one-half of HMOs pay primary care physicians by capitation ... 
60 percent ... use a withhold account."); .r« also RODWIN, supra note 26, at 140 ("Risk sharing is the norm 
inHMOs."). 
116. Set, e.g., The Advisory Board, CAPITATION I: THE NEW AMERICAN MEDICINE 38 (on file with 
the Universi!Jt o/Cincinnoli Low Rruiew) C'Capitation is largely a West Coast phenomenon."). The West Coast 
(California, Oregon, Washington and Arizona) has been characterized as an area with high penetration of 
managed care. See Press Release from KPMG Peat Marwick, Managed Carr Slut& aune I, 1995) (on file with 
the CJnii;erJi!y o/Cincinnoli Low Review) (describing Los Angeles and San Francisco, California and Portland, 
Oregon as cities with high penetration of managed care). 
117. Medicare and Medicaid do not directly enter into risk-sharing arrangements with physicians. 
However, under the two programs, the federal government has authorized Medicare and Medicaid HMOs. 
Under Medicaid, states have pursued managed care approaches for Medicaid recipients pursuant to waivers 
under§§ 1115 and 1915 of Title XIX of the Social Security Act. See William A Rivera, A Fulun fur Medicaid 
Managed Carr: The bssons o/California's SanMaJ.eo C~, 7 STAN. L. &PoL'Y REV. 105, 111-12 (1995-96). 
The number of Medicaid recipients enrolled in managed care plans increased to eight million in 1994, 
covering twenty-four percent of the Medicaid eligible population. See Prospective Payment Assessment 
Commission, Report and Recommendations to Congress, 60 Fed. Reg. 29,384, 29,402 (1995) [hereinafter 
Prospective Payment]. 
Under Medicare,§ 1876 of Title XVIII of the Social Security Act authorizes the provision of services 
for Medicare beneficiaries by managed care entities. See Health Care Financing Administration, Health 
and Human Services, 61 Fed. Reg. 69,034, 69,034 (1996). Enrollment of Medicare beneficiaries in 
Medicare HMOs rose from three percent of the total Medicare population in 1988 to almost five percent 
in 1994. See Prospective Payment, supra, at 29,410. 
Under either Medicaid or Medicare, HMOs may assume risk by receiving compensation based on 
capitation payments. See Health Care Financing Administration, 61 Fed. Reg. at 69,035. These entities 
must have procedures in place to control the cost of health services, including risk sharing or financial 
incentives with providers. See 42 C.F.R . 417 . I 03(b) (1996). 
118. See, e.g., Chase-Lubitz, supra note 12, at 481 ("[I]nherent in the HMO structure is the risk that 
a physician's loyalty will be divided between employer and patient, a risk no less evident in the HMO 
structure than in the corporate structures held illegal under the corporate practice doctrine decades 
earlier."); see also ShevaJ. Sanders, RegulaJing Managed Care Plans Uruler Currenl Low: A Radical Reversinn To 
Established Doctrine, 20 HOFSTRA L. REv. 73,86 (1991). 
A physician's ... participation in an arrangement whereby she is offered financial incentives 
to limit access to health care services, at best, raises legitimate concerns about her ability to 
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V. THE DANGER AND DISHONESTY OF RISK SHARING 
An analysis of risk sharing indicates that it is either dangerous because 
it influences physician behavior, or dishonest because it creates a hidden 
subsidy for the private insurance industry by allowing the industry to 
export part of its costs to physicians. Risk sharing could significantly 
alter the physician-patient relationship in very detrimental ways. 119 It 
could achieve this by destroying the traditional alignment between 
patients' and physicians' interests. This could cause harm to patients 
who are injured as a result of decisions influenced by financial concerns. 
The potential for such problems is more readily apparent in a system of 
individualized risk sharing in which one physician is required to assume 
the risk for that physician's own patients. However, it is unlikely that 
individualized risk sharing will prevail. The more direct the relationship 
between a negative financial inducement and damage to a patient, the 
more likely is the prospect for liability. 120 Payers tend to adopt pooled 
risk-sharing arrangements in which groups of physicians will assume the 
risk for patient care. 121 
Pooled risk sharing may or may not alter individual physician 
conduct. Pooled risk sharing does, however, allow payers to shift the 
cost of health care onto physicians. In pooled risk-sharing systems 
physicians are allowed to exercise their best professional judgment, but 
the physicians are, in effect, required to pay for exercising that 
judgment. The cause and effect relationship between the individual 
physician's decision and the negative financial consequences for the 
physician is ameliorated, however, because the pooled risk-sharing 
arrangement rewards and punishes aggregate behavior, not individual 
behavior. Pooled forms of risk sharing are merely a dishonest means to 
export the cost of financing health care needs onto the physicians. It 
ld. 
think only of her patients interests and, at worst, means that she has agreed to allow a third 
party to exercise control and direction over her professional judgment. 
119. See, e.g., RODWIN, supra note 26, at 140 ("Such incentives encourage physicians to ask themselves 
'How much will this cost me?' before providing or recommending medical services. As a result, physicians 
may recommend too little medical care."). 
120. Seein.fra notes 216-28 and accompanying text. An analysis of the cases in which plaintiffs have 
sued managed care entities and physicians have alleged that the financial incentives imposed on physicians 
contributed to the patient's harm, indicates that the courts were swayed by the lack of evidence of a direct 
causal relationship when they decided to rule against the plaintiff. In the one case in which such a causal 
relationship was clear, the court cleared the way for the plaintiff to go to trial. For a description of facts in 
Bush v. Dak, see supra note 2. 
121. See in.fra notes 130-34 and accompanying text. 
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also allows payers to relieve themselves of the potential liability 
associated with denying care in utilization review disputes. 122 
An example of individualized risk sharing would be an arrangement 
between a payer and an individual primary care physician pursuant to 
which the physician receives capitation payments and also has a 
percentage of such capitation payments withheld by the payer for the 
payer to apply against the payer's expenditures for that physician's 
referrals to specialists or admission of patients for in-patient hospital 
care. Under such a system, there would be a direct financial 
consequence to the physician each time the physician referred a patient 
to a specialist or admitted a patient to a hospital. At the end of the year, 
if the physician's referrals and hospital admissions caused the payer's 
expenditures to exceed the budget that the payer established for the 
physician, the physician would forfeit the withheld fees. 123 
Individualized risk sharing alters the traditional alignment between 
the physician's financial interests and the patient's best interests. 124 
Under the traditional fee-for-service payment system, in a marginal 
case, if the issue was whether to conduct an additional test or provide a 
particular procedure, the payment structure arguably aligned the 
physician's interest with that of the patient. There was no cost to the 
patient for conducting the additional test or recommending the 
additional procedure and there was no financial disadvantage for the 
physician. Under an individualized risk-sharing system, the physician's 
fiduciary duty to the patient may be antagonistic to the physician's 
financial interests because referring the patient for specialized services 
has a financial consequence for the physician. 
Another important aspect of this individualized risk sharing is that it 
shifts the responsibility for rationing health care services onto 
physicians. 125 This means that the payers can effectively remove 
/d. 
122. See in.fra notes 139-41 and accompanying text. 
123. Set, e.g., Hall, lnslilutiDMl Conb'ol, supra note 12, at 484. 
There are a number of variations on this theme. For example, one IPA [Independent 
practice association] established an account for each physician consisting of a percentage 
of the premiums paid by that physicians patients. Each physician received half of any 
surplus ... and contributed half of any deficit, up to ten percent of the ... [physician's] 
HMO reserve. 
124. Set genera/!y ROD WIN, supra note 26. 
125. Set Hall, supra note 21, at 758 (examining ethical issues that arise when physicians are induced 
to engage in rationing through financial incentive arrangements); see also Alexander Capron, Containing 
Health Care CosLr: Ethical and Legal Implications '![Changes in IN MtJJwds '![ P~ ~sicians, 36 CASE W. REs. 
L. REV. 708, 748-49 (noting that "reimbursement plans that place physicians . .. at financial risk are 
intended to ally physicians with society's new position that many medical interventions are not cost-
beneficial and ought to be avoided"). 
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themselves from responsibility and liability for health care rationing 
while enjoying the cost savings resulting from physicians' decisions. 126 
In effect, while the physician absorbs part of the financial costs of health 
care, the physician also absorbs the psychic cost of rationing. As 
explained by Alan Hillman: 
[I]n the absence of a social mandate that specifies how resources 
should be used, physicians should not be required to translate what 
society is "telling us in many different ways" to the point of making 
allocation decisions at the level of the individual doctor-patient 
interaction. Furthermore, these decisions certainly should not be 
made by virtue of what is in the provider's best financial interest. 127 
In this sense, individualized risk sharing allows payers to export some of 
the social cost of financing health care-making hard allocation 
decisions. 
Individualized risk sharing is a very convenient procedure for 
containing health care costs. It is also very dangerous. It relies on the 
cause and effect relationship between a physician's actions and the 
financial impact of those actions in order to conscript the physician to 
the task of cost containment, the hope being that the physician will not 
order medically unnecessary services because it is not in the physician's 
financial interest. 
At this point, the danger of risk sharing to patients is apparently 
largely speculative. Despite growing attention in the popular media, 128 
empirical research has not revealed any correlation between risk-sharing 
arrangements and any decline in quality of care. 129 This may be 
attributable to the fact that the typical risk-sharing arrangement is not 
designed to produce a direct causal relationship between an individual 
126. See McGraw, supra note 7, at 1836 ("The clandestine character of these incentives also inhibits 
the ability to link an adverse outcome to the use of financial incentive arrangements."). 
127. Alan L. Hillman, Comsporulmct, Galtkupers and Cost-ConJainers in HMOs, 318 NEW ENG.J. MED. 
1699, 1700 (1988). 
128. See, t.g., Haney & Bayles, supra note 2, at 3. The authors related the following stories: a patient 
with kidney failure who suffered cardiac arrest after his HMO primary care physician refused to refer him 
to a specialist, a patient not referred for services that would have detected cervical cancer, a patient with 
history of manic depression taken off medication by his HMO physician, a patient with lump in breast told 
by HMO physician not to worry about it and subsequently found to have spreading cancer. See also Olmos, 
supra note 8, at AI (relating lawsuit over death of colon cancer victim based on HMO physician's delay in 
conducting tests). 
129. Mary Ann Bobinski, supra note 25, at 307-09. On the other hand, surveys do reveal a 
co rrelation between patient satisfaction with the services received and the compensation arrangement 
between the physician and insurer. Consumer &Jx1rts conducted a survey that found a significant relationship 
between member satisfaction and the way primary care doctors in an HMO were paid. See Art HMOs IN 
A11.1WtT?, supra note 96, at 519. HMOs that compensated physicians on a fee-for-service basis have tended 
to rate higher in member satisfaction than HMOs that either capitated physicians' payments or subjected 
physicians to fee withholds. See id. at 523. 
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physician's actions and a negative financial consequence to that 
physician. Risk-sharing systems are typically designed to punish and 
reward the aggregate conduct of a group of physicians through pooled 
risk-sharing arrangements. 130 
Insurers establish pooled risk-sharing arrangements through two 
general methods. Under the first method, the payer may enter into an 
agreement with an organized group of physicians, either a group 
practice or an independent practice association. 131 Under this system, 
the group may be subject to a risk-sharing arrangement, for example, 
the group may accept capitation payments and be responsible for 
compensating the individual physicians from the capitation payments. 132 
Under the second method, the payer may pool risk by entering into 
agreements with individual physicians, but placing withheld fees at risk 
for the performance of the entire group of physicians. 133 For example, 
although the insurer enters into individual capitation agreements with 
physicians, it might withhold fees from the individual physicians and 
condition the return of such withheld fees based on the expenditures for 
referral to specialists and admissions to hospitals by all of the primary 
care physicians under contract with the managed care entity in a 
geographic region. 134 
Under either of the pooled risk-sharing arrangements, there is nothing 
that the individual physician can do to recoup the physician's withheld 
fees. Therefore, pooled risk-sharing arrangements arguably decrease 
the potential realignment of the individual physician's interests vis-a-vis 
the patient's interests and, theoretically, have less potential for harm. 
130. Set Alan L Hillman et al., ConJractualArrangemmts ~ HMOs anJ Primary Can l'f9sicions: Three-
Ttered HMOs aruJ Risk Pools, 30 MEDICAL CARE 136 (1992). The authors attempt to refine the analysis of 
financial incentives paid to physicians. They note: that previous studies failed to distinguish between two-
tiered and three-tiered arrangements. Set id. Under a two-tiered arrangement, the: HMO contracts directly 
with the individual physicians. Set id. Under a thrce-.tiered arrangement, the HMO contracts with some 
middle tier entity which in tum contracts with the individual's physicians. Set id. One point of this study 
is that the actual percentage of individual physicians actually compensated on the basis of capitation might 
be overstated because some: of the capitation payments reported were actually being paid to a middle-tier 
entity. Set id. at 141. For the purposes of risk sharing, it would be: the middle-tier entity and not an 
individual physician who was engaged in risk sharing. Set id. at 140. They note, "in three-tiered HMOs 
the intervening entities may change the contractual arrangements so that the: financial incentives and other 
obligations do not directly impact the physicians." /d. at 137. Approximately 35% of the HMOs that 
responded to the: survey were three-tiered HMOs. Set id. at 142 tbl.2 . Further, in accordance: with the 
survey, IPA risk pools only involve one physician in 15% of the cases. Set id. at 144, 143 tbl.6. 
131. Set id. at 138 (noting that the HMO contract may be: with the medical staff of a hospital, a 
physician group, or the entity formed for payment purposes). 
132. Set id. at 140. 
133. HMOs that contract directly with individual physicians arc referred to as having two tiers. Set 
id. at 137. In such two-tiered systems, 44% involved risk pools that cover all physicians in the HMO. SU 
id. at 144 tbl.6. Only 19% of such systems engage in risk pooling on an individual basis. Set id. 
134. Setid.at140. 
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However, this is only true to the extent that the group of physicians do 
not have power to enforce conduct in order to meet group goals and to 
the extent that risk sharing does not influence the group's exercise of 
power over the individual physician. Depending on the degree of power 
that the group exercises over the individual, the group can establish the 
same performance criteria that the payer uses and thereby subject 
individual physicians to the same pressures as individualized risk-sharing 
arrangements. 135 
To the extent that the group of physicians covered by a pooled risk-
sharing arrangement has no control over the conduct of individual 
physicians in the pool, pooled risk sharing is merely a dishonest means 
to require physicians to subsidize part of the insurance industry's cost of 
doing business. To the extent that the law allows this to continue, the 
law provides a hidden subsidy for the private health insurance field. 
This is the beauty of pooled risk-sharing arrangements-the system is 
designed so that the relationship between the physician's conduct and 
the system is so tenuous that it escapes scrutiny; 136 yet, the system 
effectively allows the insurers to export part of their costs to the 
physicians. 
Another attraction of risk sharing for payers is that it potentially 
renders the conflicts inherent in utilization review moot. Utilization 
review is criticized for being ineffective and cumbersome. 137 However, 
utilization review is also dangerous for payers because it is explicit. 
Under utilization review, the physician is not required to abandon the 
physician's traditional role. Utilization review merely means that in 
order to obtain what the physician believes is in the patient's best 
interest, the physician might need to become an advocate for the patient 
against the payer's utilization review program. 138 This creates a 
potential ground ofliability for the payer who denies care to a patient 
based on a utilization review decision. In Wukline v. State139 and Wilson 
135. S« id. at 146 (noting that managerial control affected by peer pressure and group norms might 
cause individual members to change behavior, even though the degree of risk on the individual physician 
might be very small). 
136. S«in.fra notes 216-28 and accompanying text. 
137. S« .supra notes 95-98 and accompanying text. 
138. S..., e.g., Robert A Berenson, A PI!Jsician's RejlectiDns, 19 HAsTINGS CENTER REPoRTS 13 Gan.-
Feb., 1989) (noting that utilization review relies on the physician's willingness to become adversarial, rather 
than on the "merits" of the case, and that most physicians take responsibility for acting as an advocate very 
seriously). 
139. 239 Cal. Rptr. 810 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986). In Wzckline, the court dealt with the issue of whether 
a payer could be liable for injury to a patient resulting from the payer's decision to deny financing for the 
patient's medical can: as requested by the patient's physician. S« id. at 811. Ms. Wickline's doctor had 
requested an extension of eight days for her recovery from an operation on her leg. S« iJ. at 813. The 
utilization reviewers for the Medi-Cal Program denied the request for eight additional days and granted 
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v. Blue Cross of Soutlzem California, IW California courts indicated that, in the 
appropriate circumstance, a payer's utilization review decision could 
serve as the basis for a cause of action. 141 To the extent that risk sharing 
could prevent salient disputes over medical necessity decisions, it tends 
to reduce the exposure to liability for payers. Individualized risk sharing 
potentially achieves this goal by introducing adverse financial 
consequences to the physician's decision to refer the patient to specialists 
or for in-patient hospital services. Pooled risk sharing potentially 
renders the issue moot for the payers. It does not matter to the payer if 
the payer has to pay for care if the payment ultimately comes out of the 
physician's own pocket anyway. 
It is apparent that there is a great deal of care provided which is not 
medically necessary. 142 Therefore, there is a need to find a way to 
control the unfettered discretion to consume health care services. For 
some procedures, at least, standardized treatment protocols may be 
useful. 143 The health care system may be in need of some centralized 
a stay of only four days. Su id. at 814. Ms. Wickline was discharged from the hospital at the end of four 
days and returned to her home. Su id. at 815. She subsequently suffered complications which resulted in 
her leg being amputated. S.. id. at 811. She sued the Medi-Cal program, alleging that its utilization review 
decision had contributed to her injury. S.. id. The court dismissed the claim but did state that under the 
appropriate circumstances, a utilization review decision could serve as the basis ofliability. S.. id. at 819-20. 
140. 271 Cal. Rptr. 876 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990). In this case, the court revisited the issue ofliability for 
utilization review. S.. id. at 880-81 . Wilson was diagnosed as suffering from clinical depression, a condition 
for which his physician recommended inpatient psychiatric care. S.. id. at 877. The utilization reviewer 
determined that such care was not necessary and indicated that Wilson's insurance would not pay for such 
care. S.. id. at 877-78, 882. Mr. Wilson was discharged and subsequently committed suicide. S.. id. at 878. 
The court determined that the patient's estate had a cause of action against the utilization reviewer. Su id. 
at 878, 883, 884-85. 
I d. 
Id. 
141. Su id. at 883; see also Wzckline, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 819. 
Third party payers of health care services can be held legally accountable when medically 
inappropriate decisions result from defects in the design or implementation of cost 
containment mechanisms as, for example, when appeals made on a patient's behalf for 
medical or hospital care are arbitrarily ignored or unreasonably disregarded or overridden. 
142. Su Wasted Health GaTe Dollars, CONSUMER REP., July 1992, at 435, 436-37. 
Many researchers have now attempted to qualify the rate at which specific procedures are 
used unnecessarily. Twenty percent represents a rough average of the rates found in major 
studies, and is a figure that several leading researchers in this field told us was a good 
approximation for the rate of unnecessary care. 
Twenty percent also seems to be a conservative estimate of the rate of unnecessary 
hospital days, even though changes in Medicare and private-insurance policies make it 
difficult to estimate that number precisely. 
143. Su Hall, Insiituti.onal ConJrol, supra note 12, at 478-79. 
Treatment protocols ... serve some useful purpose simply as a checklist that forces 
physicians to think more carefully about their treatment decisions. By setting a baseline to 
which physicians must refer in formulating their treatment plan, protocols may help revise 
and formalize the informal heuristics that arc central to physicians' judgmental thought 
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authority that will gather such information and determine the manner 
in which the information is used. 144 However, this process should be 
salient, explicit, and subject to accountability. Utilization review, 
despite any of its perceived shortcomings, is a more honest, open, and 
accountable means to achieve this goal. Despite the complaints about 
utilization review, it has one overriding benefit-the process is 
notoriously open. The process openly pits the physician and the patient 
against the utilization review organization. There is nothing secretive 
about the process. 145 
Cost containment that is achieved by risk sharing is the exact opposite 
of utilization review. Instead ofbeing open and notorious, it is secretive 
and subterranean. The disputes over care are not salient, they are 
internal and fought out within the conscience of the individual physician 
at the point of delivery. They may even be subconscious, operating 
under the surface of the provider's attempt to exercise professional 
judgment. There is no adversarial fleshing out of the decision. 
VI. CORPORATE PRACTICE DOCTRINE AS A RESPONSE TO 
RISK SHARING 
Policy makers and commentators condone risk sharing as an effective 
strategy in a program to contain health care costs. 146 However, risk 
sharing evokes the same concerns that prompted courts and legislatures 
to adopt the prohibition on the corporate practice of medicine. Risk 
sharing has the potential for corrupting medical judgment to the 
detriment of quality of health care. In fact, risk sharing may be more 
vulnerable to charges of conflict of interest than the typical 
arrangements that were the concern of the corporate practice doctrine. 
Whether a physician was on a salary or not, or shared revenues with a 
lay person probably did not create as much of a temptation as arrange-
ments whereby percentages of the physician's income are withheld 
toward the attainment of profit and loss goals. 
processes. 
Id. (footnote omitted). 
144. The need for a centralized data gathering entity is supported by the concept of"small area 
variation." Wasted Hea/Jh Care Dollms, CONSUMER REP., supra note 142, at 441. This concept was 
developed by John Wennberg of Dartmouth University to describe the phenomenon of variation between 
communities with respect to physicians' medical decisions. Su iJ. Because physicians practice in local 
areas, they tend to take their cues from the physicians practicing around them. Su iJ. This leads to 
variations from community to community. Su id. 
145. Su Berenson, supra note 138, at 13. 
146. Su, e.g., Hall, lnsliJutWnal Control, supra note 101, at 507-08. 
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Risk sharing blurs the distinctions between inherendy antagonistic 
health care functions. It places physicians in the business of 
insurance. 147 Insurance involves accepting the risk of liability for 
expenses in exchange for a ·payment of premiums. 148 Capitation 
payments are insurance premiums that physicians accept in exchange 
for their agreement to accept the expenses associated with their patients' 
needs for medical services. 149 The fact that the risk is internal is oflitde 
comfort. If physicians find that the demand for their time is beyond 
what the capitation payments allow them to provide, what happens? 
Along the same lines, fee withholding represents a physician's agreement 
to place certain assets at risk for medical expenditures. 150 This is the 
same as an insurance company setting aside reserves to meet 
expenditures. One commentator has noted: 
Risk-sharing capitation relationships implicate the same concerns as 
traditional insurance relationships. Like traditional insurers, 
providers can minimize their costs by denying legitimate claims. 
However, unlike traditional insurers, providers are capable of 
controlling whether many of the claims are generated; by denying 
access to care for which the provider is at risk, the cost is avoided. 151 
The difference is that activities by insurance companies are heavily 
regulated, 152 while physician insurance activities are not. Another 
difference is that insurance companies have access to the actuarial data 
necessary to set capitation rates and establish risk-pool budgets. 153 This 
allows them to attempt to manipulate their exposure to loss. Physicians 
/d. 
147. Sa Sanders, supra note 118, at 109. 
148. Said. 
149. Said. at 110. 
150. Sa, e.g., Hillman, supra note 23, at 1744 (discussing typical withhold arrangement). 
151. Sanders, supra note 118, at 112. 
152. FuRROW ET AL., supra note 2, at 207. 
Private health insurance is extensively regulated in the United States. Traditionally, 
insurance regulation has been the business of the states . ... 
State regulations attempt to assure the solvency of health insurance by prescribing 
capital and financial reserve requirements. They attempt to protect consumers by requiring 
disclosure of contract information, standardized printing of terms of coverage, insurance 
company bonding and auditing. Some states review and approve the rates charged by some 
insurers to some insureds (e.g. Blue Cross individual policy rates) . .. . State laws often 
require private insurers to provide certain benefits, to pay for the services of certain 
providers, or to make coverage available to certain persons. State regulations also address 
coordination of benefits in situations where more than one family member is covered by 
more than one insurer. 
153. Sa, e.g., Michael Kraten & R. Michael Yesh, Hea/Jlt Can Organitations-The IJusilws Implications 
'![CapiJ.aliDn lUvtnut MeJJwdologiM, 14 AM. BANKR. INST.J. 15, 15 (1995) (noting the need for analysis of 
historical costs by demographic group in order to set capitation rates). 
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do not typically have access to such data and must rely on the good faith 
of the insurance companies to set capitation rates and risk-pool budgets 
that reflect the insurance company's estimate of what care should be 
needed. 154 Without the protection of the corporate practice doctrine, 
physicians share risk--engage in the business of insurance-as unequal 
partners with insurance companies. 
The insurance industry is also covered by laws that protect the patient 
in the event of the insurer's insolvency. Insurance guaranty associations 
provided for under state laws require the association to fulfill an 
insolvent insurance company's obligations under its policies.155 
Although HMOs are generally not included in the guaranty 
associations, there are also state laws that prohibit physicians from 
pursuing patients for claims in the event of an HMO's insolvency. 156 
The public does not have protection against physician insolvency which 
may result from its risk-sharing ventures. These concerns have 
influenced the National Association oflnsurance Commissioners to take 
a closer look at the phenomenon of risk assumption by providers. 157 The 
disturbing trend is that state regulations appear to condone risk sharing 
as long as there is an insurance company or HMO in the 
arrangement. 158 
154. See id. ("Uncertainties regarding actual costs . . . often lead health care organizations to accept 
insufficient capitation rates and incur significant financial risk."); see also Allison Overbay & Mark Hall, 
Insurance ReguloJ.Wn of Providers That &ar Risk, 22 AM.J.L. & MED. 361, 368 (1996) (noting that lack of 
actuarial expertise by provider groups may cause them to set capitation rates too low). 
155. See Mark A. Rodwin, Consumer Protection and Manogtd Care: Is.rws, Reform Proposals and Trade Offi, 
32 Hous. L. REV. 1319, 1373 n.262 (1996) (referring to guaranty association statutes in Arkansas, 
California, Colorado, Connecticut, Hawaii, Illinois, Maine, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, New 
Hampshire, New Mexico, North Carolina, and North Dakota). These statutes provide for "guaranty 
associations" that fulfill the obligations of insolvent commercial insurers. See id. at 1373. In some 
jurisdictions, HMOs are also covered by guaranty associations. Karen 0 . Bowdre, Guartm!J Association Lm.o 
in Alabama, 20 CUMBERLAND L. REV. 321, 357 (1989-90) (noting establishment of HMO guaranty 
allocations in Alabama, F1orida, and Illinois and inclusion ofHMOs in life and health insurance guaranty 
associations in Utah and Wisconsin); see also National Association oflnsurance Commissioners (NAIC), 
White Paper on Risk Bearing Entities (Dec. 1996), reprinJulin 6 BNAHEALTII L. REP. 73, 95 (Jan. 9, 1997) 
(hereinafter NAIC White Paper] (noting that most states do not include HMOs and other managed care 
entities in guaranty association framework). 
156. See Jay M. Howard, TheA.fo:rmaJh of HMO Insolveng: Consitlerationsfor ProviJers, 4 ANNAL'i HEALrn 
L. 87, 95 (1995) (noting requirement ofNAIC Model HMO Act which provides that a "hold harmless" 
clause must be included in contract between HMO and contracting physician). Hold harmless clauses 
require physicians to contractually agree not to bill the patient in the event of the HMO's inability to pay. 
See id. at 96-97. The Model Act and variations thereon, have been adopted in over half of the states. See 
NAIC White Paper, mpra note 155, at 82. The Federal HMO Act also requires that enrollees not become 
responsible for debts owed by the HMO. See Howard, supra at 93. 
157. See NAIC White Paper, supra note 155, at 74. (noting that an underlying assumption is that all 
entities that assume health insurance risk should be subject to solvency and other appropriate consumer 
protection standards). 
158. See id. at 85 ("The vast majority of states do not require a downstream contractor to obtain an 
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The message appears to be that the only way to curb health costs is 
if everyone shares in the financial risk. The private health insurance 
industry has engaged in financial risk shifting not only with physicians, 
but also with employers, hospitals, pharmaceutical companies, and 
patients. All of this risk sharing has proceeded with the acquiescence, 
and sometimes leadership, of the federal government. 
Employers have accepted first dollar financial risk for health services 
by moving to self-insured plans159 under the umbrella of the Employees 
Retirement and Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). 160 ERISA 
affords employers certain advantages such as preemption of state law 
causes of action and remedies. 161 ERISA also allows employers to avoid 
mandatory state health insurance requirements. 162 Through self-
insurance, the insurance companies impose upon employers the 
obligation to engage in rationing health care. 163 Insurance companies 
have also required hospitals to accept per diem payments-another 
form of insurance premium. 164 Further, insurance companies have 
required patients to assume larger portions of the first dollar care by 
imposing higher deductibles and co-insurance requirements. 165 Insurers 
are also beginning to enter into risk-sharing arrangements with 
insurance license to accept insurance risk."). "Downstream" risk arrangements are contractual agreements 
through which physicians assume part of the insurance company's or HMO's risk. /d. Such downstream 
risk involves the mechanisms described in this Article: capitation and fee withholding. Su id. at 79-80. 
Such arrangements admittedly involve the provider in the business of insurance; however, regulators have 
been inconsistent in their application of insurance requirements on such arrangements. Su id.; see alro 
Overbay & Hall, supra note 154, at 372 (noting that most states have opted to characterize downstream risk 
assumption as subcontracting, rather than ·the business of insurance, under the rationale that the main 
entity responsible for providing health care-the HMO-is already subject to strict regulation). 
159. SuThomas Bodenheimer, The Recon.figuration I![ U.S. Medicine, 274JAMA 85, 87 (1995) (noting 
that, in 1991, 40% of employees receiving employee-sponsored health benefits were in self-insured plans). 
160. Pub. L No. 93-406,88 Stat. 829 (1974) (codified as amended in scattered sections of26 U .S.C. 
and 29 U.S.C.). 
161. Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 44 (1987) (turning aside claim under Mississippi 
state law alleging bad faith denial of claim). 
162. Su Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U .S. 724 (1985) (holding that state could 
impose mandated mental health coverage on insurers but could not require the same for self-funded 
employers). 
163. See, e.g., McGann v. H &H Music Co., 946 F.2d 401 (5th Cir. 1991) and Owens v. Storehouse, 
984 F.2d 394 (II th Cir. 1993). In each of these cases, employers chose to limit coverage for employees 
suffering from AIDS in light of the threat to the fiscal integrity of their employee health benefit programs. 
The choices faced by such employers has been characterized as a "fundamental dilemma ... one person's 
need for a huge amount of insurance coverage versus other group member's continued need for routine 
coverage." Maria O'Brien Hylton, ln.lliTance Risk Classiji.cation, A.for McGann: Managing Risk EJ!icimt9 in the 
Shadow I![ the ADA, 4 7 BAYLOR L REV. 59, 80 (1995). Self-insurance offers employers a flexible alternative 
to offering no health benefits at all. Su id. at 77. 
164. Su Randall, supra note 4, at 31. 
165. Suid. at 17. 
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pharmaceutical companies.166 Under the current regime, it appears that 
everyone is required to shoulder some financial risk for health care 
services. 
Viewed in this context, risk sharing between insurers and physicians 
is just another example of the larger phenomenon. There is one 
fundamental difference, however. The other players are not decision 
makers operating in a fiduciary capacity. Hospitals do not decide 
whether to admit a patient-physicians do. Hospitals do not decide on 
the course of a patient's treatment-physicians do. Employers do not 
decide whether a patient needs a particular treatment-employers 
merely decide whether the employer sponsored health benefit package 
will cover the treatment. Employers do not establish treatment plans for 
patients. 
Therefore, although risk sharing by physicians is consistent with the 
current environment in which it is assumed that everyone must assume 
some of the risk of health care expenditures in order to contain cost, 
there is something inherendy problematic in physician risk sharing. By 
co-opting physicians to the insurance function, we remove an important 
actor in the preservation of the quality of health care-the advocate for 
treatment. 167 
If mechanisms were in place that prevented the payers from shifting 
the cost of doing business to the providers, several things might occur: 
(1) health insurance premiums would rise to a higher level thereby 
threatening additional consumers with the prospect of becoming 
uninsured, (2) there would be fewer insurance providers and perhaps 
more consolidation in health care financing, and (3) an honest effort to 
contain costs might occur. Each of these would be a benefit. To the 
extent that higher premiums threaten more individuals with loss of 
insurance coverage, this might increase political pressure for some type 
of universal health coverage. 168 To the extent that numbers of payers 
were forced out of the market, this would allow the remaining insurers 
166. See, e.g., Alicia A. Barnett, Strolegies fur tire Future: PluzrmaceulicaJ Companies Empha.ri<.ing Distfl.ft 
Mlllll1gttnDII, Risk Slurring, 13 Bus. & HEALTH 46 (1995) ("[U]nder such arrangements the pharmaceutical 
company shares the risk for a successful outcome. In one such arrangement, the drug company refunds 
money to the insurer if the patient's symptoms worsen after use of a drug sold to the insurer."). 
167. S. Sanders, supra note 118, at 112 ("The physician acts as a check on the traditional insurer 
because he will at least alert the patient to the fact that care is indicated."); Randall, supra note 4, at 34 
("Historically, we have seen how the profit motive worked to increase utilization. There is no reason to 
think that similar dysfunctions will not occur in a system designed to enhance profits by decreasing 
utilization." (footnote omitted)). 
168. S. Mollyann Brodie & Robert]. Blendon, 17rt Public's CanJribuJion to C~ GridJDclc tm HtaiJh 
Can &jonn, 20]. HEALTH Pol.. PoL 'Y & L. 403, 403-04 (1995) (noting that growing number of uninsured, 
among other things, contributed to middle class concerns about health care and that such concern was a 
factor in the health care reform debate). 
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to take advantage of the law oflarge numbers and risk pooling, which 
is the fundamental principle upon which insurance operates. 169 To the 
extent that a more honest approach is taken to contain costs, we would 
be forced into undertaking the data collection necessary to provide a 
good set of clinical practice protocols. 170 
In this context, the old dogma-the prohibition on the corporate 
practice of medicine--assumes a new purpose. It would maintain a 
separation of function. Insurers should insure, physicians should treat 
patients, and conflicts between the two should not be subverted. The 
corporate practice doctrine would prevent insurers from exporting part 
of their costs to physicians. Exportation of their costs allows the industry. 
to operate as if it can offer a viable product in a profitable business. 
Health coverage is a viable product only if it is subsidized. Resurrection 
of the corporate practice doctrine would prevent exportation of the costs 
of doing business in the health financing field. This would reveal that 
provision health care coverage through the private market is inefficient. 
Another useful purpose for a reassertion of the corporate practice 
doctrine would be to repair the damage to the fiduciary relationship 
between the patient and the physician. One original purpose of the 
doctrine was to prevent the commercialization of the medical 
profession. 171 Preventing commercialization would engender public 
trust in the profession. 172 Under utilization review, the physician can 
still function as a fiduciary. 173 However, to the extent that risk sharing 
becomes more prevalent and knowledge about its prevalence in health 
care financing spreads to the public, the public becomes less trustful of 
physicians' financial motives. 174 Although the empirical evidence does 
169. S« Mark A. Hall, The Role ojlnJUTance Purchasing CooperaJives in Hta/Jh Can Refrmn, 3 KAN.J.L. & 
PuB. PoL'Y 95, 98 (1993-94) ("According to the statistical Law of Large Numbers, the ability to predict 
accurately the actual loss a group will suffer decreases as the group becomes smaller; therefore, small risk 
pools require a larger risk premium per equivalent expected loss than do larger groups."). 
170. See The Health Care Study Group, Report: Understanding the Chaius in Hta/Jh Can Reform, 19 J. 
HEAL Til PoL. PoL 'Y & L. 499, 527 (1994) ("Treatment protocols are standard procedures for diagnosing 
disease, given certain symptoms, or treating disease, given a diagnosis ... . They require detailed and 
expensive studies involving large numbers of patients and controls."). 
171 . S« Alanson W. Willcox, Hospilal.rand the CorporaJe /tadiaofMttli&iJv, 45 CORNEILL. Q 432,446 
(1960). 
172. S«, e.g., Bartron v. Codington County, 2 N.W.2d 337,346 (S.D. 1942) ~'(A]n ethical, ltusb.oort!!J 
and unselfish professionalism as the community needs and wants cannot survive in a purely commercial 
atmosphere." (emphasis added)). 
173. S« Sanders, mpra note 118, at 112 (noting that under traditional insurance, a physician acts as 
a check on the traditional insurer because the physician will alert the patient to the need for care). 
174. S« Mechanic & Schlesinger, supra note 9, at 1694 ("(T]he limited evidence available suggests 
that many (patients] are uncomfortable with incentives that require physicians to balance the benefits of 
their medical care against the costs that it engenders for the plan. Thus, payment arrangements could 
significantly undermine patients' beliefs that their physicians are acting as their agents."). 
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not indicate that risk sharing has caused a deterioration in the quality of 
patient care, 175 stories abound in the popular media based on the 
assumption that physicians' decision making is impaired because of 
negative financial inducements. 176 The idea that people cannot trust 
their physicians yields a rather different system for delivering health care 
than a system based on an assumption of trust. It should be noted that 
the "quality" ofhealth care has a psychic, as well as concrete, dimension 
and that this quality can be diminished if the patient does not trust the 
physician. 177 
There are some advocates for altering the patient-physician 
relationship. They believe that the cost spiral in medicine was the result 
of the patemalistic178 relationship between patients and physicians. 179 
The physician talked, the patient listened without question. The 
physician prescribed medication which the patient ingested without 
question. The patient endured surgical procedures without a thought 
about obtaining a second opinion. The problems with the costs of 
health care resulted from the unwavering trust that the patient placed 
in the physician's decision making. According to these advocates, it 
would not be a such a bad thing to have patients assume a mo'fe "arm's 
length" relationship with physicians and become more questioning, 
more informed consumers ofhealth care services. 180 
175. Setsupranote 129. 
176. Set supra note 128. 
177. Set Capron, supra note 125, at 737-38 ("It has even been found that many patients experience 
therapeutic benefits resulting from trust in their physician and her judgment." (citing E. F'REIEDSON, 
PROffSSION OF MEDICINE: A STIJDY OF TilE SOCIOLOGY OF APPilED KNOWLEDGE 263-68 (1970))); see 
also RODWIN, supra note 26, at 153 (noting that incentives give patients reason to doubt their physician's 
neutrality and thereby weaken the informed consent process). 
178. Set Hall, supra note 21, at 728 ("[I] he central value of professionally dominated medical ethics 
is patient well-being, traditionally defined in a highly paternalistic and authoritarian fashion."). 
179. Set, e.g., Hall, supra note 21 , at 729-31. Professor Hall describes a school of medical ethics 
described as the "beneficence" school. Underlying this school was the thought that the physician would 
direct the patient in the selection of treatment options. For this school, the patient's trust in the physician 
was required. This required the physician to be above concerns about the costs of treatment. Hall indicates 
that such a model "fits only the comprehensive, unregulated, fee-for-service type of insurance that 
dominated prior to 1980. It is precisely this form of insurance, however, that is driving up the costs of 
treatment to the extent that insurance is unaffordable for tens of millions." /d. at 731; see also John A. 
Siliciano, Weallh, Equi9 and IN Unitary Medical Malpractice Staruiard, 77 VA. L. REV. 439, 449 (1991) ("The 
physician-patient relationship ... was paternalistic and fiduciary in nature, and thus encouraged health care 
consumers to acquiesce in the decisions of their physicians."). 
180. S. Maxwell]. Mehlman, Medical Advocates: A Call For a New Profession, I WIDENER L. SYMP.J. 
299, 310. In this article, Mehlman describes a "consumerism" approach (with which he disagrees). 
According to Mehlman, under this consumerism approach: 
[l]he emphasis is on self-reliance. Patients are repeatedly being urged to protect their 
interests themselves. "Choose your physician or health plan wisely," they are told. 
According to this consumerism approach, patients should arm themselves with information, 
often obtaining it from the health plans or providers themselves, and make informed, self-
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However, to the extent that such an arm's length relationship wouJd 
be better, this does not mean that this relationship should be fostered by 
the introduction of subde negative financial considerations into the 
physician-patient relationship. Utilization review, despite its perceived 
shortcomings, provides the opportunity for an arm's length relationship 
by subjecting a physician's decision to an external second opinion. 
Ideally, this second opinion will be informed by the best available 
current treatment protocols. This would be a much better approach to 
correcting the perceived abuses arising from a paternalistic physician-
patient relationship than a subterranean process that relies on patients' 
unhealthy suspicions about their physicians' financial motives. Indeed, 
such suspicion diminishes the quality of care. Reassertion of the 
corporate practice doctrine could reestablish the trust by removing the 
appearance of impropriety. 
VII. THE FEDERAL RESPONSE TO RISK-SHARING ARRANGEMENTS 
The current federal approach to health care cost recognizes the 
connection between financial benefit to physicians and their decision 
making. Federal policy recognizes that financial inducements can yield 
overutilization of health care resources. Thus, federal policy has 
implemented rules to disrupt this causal relationship in the form of 
outright prohibitions on certain types of financial arrangements that 
have the potential to cause overutilizat:lon of health care resources. On 
the other hand, the federal government has been slow to recognize that 
negative financial inducements inherent in capitation and fee 
withholding have the potential to cause underutilization of services. In 
effect, the federal response is asymmetrical. It prohibits financial 
relationships that induce overutilization on one hand, but tolerates 
financial relationships that could cause underutilization, on the other. 
Under the corporate practice doctrine, a court did not have to 
determine that the conflict of interest actually resulted in a negative 
consequence for the patient or that because of the conflict of interest the 
physician ever actually acted in a manner that was not in the patient's 
best interest. 181 According to the doctrine, the risk of abuse was so great 
interested choices. 
I d.; see also E. Haavi Morreim, Redefining QJuJi!y by Reassigning Responsibili!J, 20 AM. J. L. & MED. 79, I 02 
(1994) (describing benefits of a system in which patients motivated by economic consequences of care 
decisions interact with physicians on a more informed basis). 
181. See, e.g., Bartron v. Codington County, 2 N.W.2d 337,346 (S.D. 1942) (''Though the exhibited 
instance of that conduct [referring to a corporate practice arrangement] has accomplished no evil, if its 
inherent tendency be at war with public interest, it is contrary to public policy."). 
! 
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as to justify barring the arrangement that would create the potential for 
abuse. 182 In other words, the best protection was removing temptation 
altogether. 
The federal government uses the same approach of removing 
temptation when addressing financial transactions that have the 
potential for causing overutilization of services. Studies have indicated 
that Medicare beneficiaries treated by physicians who owned or invested 
in independent clinical laboratories received forty-five percent more 
laboratory services from the independent clinical laboratories than 
Medicare beneficiaries in general. 183 These results supported the 
premise that, if it is to a physician's economic advantage, the physician 
will overutilize services. Therefore, federal law imposes preventative 
measures by prohibiting relationships that create the potential for 
excessive utilization. 
Hence, federal legislation broadly proscribes transactions and 
relationships that have the potential to lead to overutilization of medical 
servtces. Under Stark II, 184 a physician is prohibited from making 
182. See id. 
183. /s.rws lU/tJJed Ill ~sician "Selj-Rejmals:" Hearings on H.R. 939 /Jeforr thl Subcomm. on Oversight ofthl 
Comm. on Wl!J's and Means, I 0 I st Cong. (1989) {testimony of Michael Zimmerman, Director, Medicare and 
Medicaid Issues, Human Resources Division of the U.S. Government Accounting Office:). 
184. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-239, 103 Stat. 2106 (codified as 
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn (1995)); Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-6, 
107 Stal 596 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn (1994)). Section 1395nn provides, in pertinent 
part: 
Limitation on certain physician referrals 
(a) Prohibition of certain referrals 
(I) In general 
Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, if a physician (or an 
immediate family member of such physician) has a financial relationship 
with an entity specified in paragraph (2), then -
(A) the physician may not make a referral to the: entity for the: furnishing 
of designated health services for which payment otherwise may be 
made under this subchapter, and 
(B) the entity may not present or cause to be presented a claim under 
this subchapter or bill to any individual, third party payor, or other 
entity for designated health services furnished pursuant to a referral 
prohibited under subparagraph (A). 
(2) Financial relationship specified 
For purposes of this section, a financial relationship of a physician (or an 
immediate family member of such physician) with an entity specified in 
this paragraph is -
(A) except as provided in subsections (c) and (d) of this section, an 
ownership or investment interest in the: entity, or 
(B) except as provided in subsection (c:) of this section, a compensation 
arrangement (as defined in subsection (h)(l) of this section) between 
the physician (or an immediate family member of such physician) 
and the entity. 
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referrals for the furnishing of designated health services for which 
payment may be made under the Medicare or Medicaid program to any 
entity with which the physician has a financial relationship. 185 Under 
the Medicare and Medicaid Fraud and Abuse statute, 186 it is illegal to 
solicit or receive any remuneration in return for referring a patient for 
services. 187 Although there are exceptions to each of these laws, the 
exceptions recognize that any compensation or benefit flowing to the 
physician in excess of the fair market value for services rendered by the 
physician presents a potential for overutilization. 188 Therefore, the 
I d. 
185. See id. 
186. Medicare-Medicaid Anti-Fraud and Abuse Amendments, Pub. L. No. 95-142, 91 Stat. 1175 
(1977) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
187. Social Security Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-603, 86 Stat. 1329 (codified as amended 
42 U.S.C. 1320a-7b (1988)). The anti-kickback statute provides in pertinent part as follows: 
(b) Illegal remunerations 
(I) Whoever knowingly and willfully solicits or receives any remuneration (Including 
any kickback, bribe, or rebate) directly or indirectly, overtly or covertly, in cash 
orin kind-
(A) in return for referring an individual to a person for the furnishing or 
arranging for the furnishing of any item or service for which payment may 
be made in whole or in part under [Medicare or Medicaid], or 
(B) in return for purchasing, leasing, ordering, or arranging for or 
recommending purchasing, leasing, or ordering any good, facility, service, 
or item for which payment may be made in whole or in part under 
[Medicare or Medicaid) , 
shall be guilty of a felony and upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not more than S25,000 
or imprisoned for not more than five years or both. 
(2) Whoever knowingly and willfully offers or pays any remuneration (Including any 
kickback, bribe, or rebate) directly or indirectly, overtly or covertly, in cash or 
in kind to any person to induce such person -
(A) to refer an individual to a person for the furnishing or arranging for the 
furnishing of any item or service for which payment may be made in whole 
or in part under [Medicare or Medicaid), or 
(B) to purchase, lease, or arrange for or recommend purchasing, leasing, or 
ordering any good, facility, service, or item for which payment may be 
made in whole or in part under subchapter XVIII of this chapter or a State 
health care program, 
shall be guilty of a felony . .. 
42 U .S.C. 1320a-7b(b) (1988 & Supp. V 1993). 
188. See 42 C.F.R. § 1001.952 (1996). This "safe harbor" provides that the anti-kickback law is not 
violated if, among other things: 
I d. 
The aggregate rental charge is set in advance, is consistent with fair market value in arms-
length transactions and is not determined in a manner that takes into account the volume 
or value of any referrals or business otherwise generated between the parties for which 
payment may be made in whole or in part under Medicare or [Medicaid) . ... 
[T) he term fair TfiiJTht value means the value of the rental property for general commercial 
purposes, but shall not be adjusted to reflect the additional value that one party (either the 
prospective lessee or lessor) would attribute to the property as a result of its proximity or 
convenience to sources of referrals or business otherwise generated for which payment may 
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exceptions are narrowly drawn to eliminate any excess compensation. 
For example, a physician may lease office space from a hospital to which 
the physician admits patients and not violate the anti-referral laws if the 
physician leases the space at its fair rental value. However, if the 
hospital subsidizes the physician's rent by offering the physician below-
market lease rates, the law would be violated. 189 
The federal government has clearly acknowledged that there may be 
a connection between financial inducements and overutilization of 
health care services. It has addressed this situation by prohibiting 
financial arrangements that have the potential to cause physicians to 
overutilize health care resources. If it is true that financial inducements 
can increase utilization, is it also not true that financial incentives can 
cause physicians to underutilize services? 
The federal government has not approached the potential problems 
with negative financial inducements with the fervor that it has used to 
address positive financial inducements. 190 The federal government 
acknowledges that there is a potential for negative inducements to cause 
physicians to underutilize health care resources. 191 However, instead of 
broadly prohibiting such inducements, the federal government draws a 
line between permissible and impermissible negative financial 
inducements in an attempt to preserve risk sharing. Thus, in 1986, 
Congress amended the Medicare statute to prohibit hospitals and 
HMOs from making direct or indirect payments to physicians for the 
purpose of inducing physicians to reduce services to Medicare 
beneficiaries. 192 Risk-sharing mechanisms have the purpose of reducing 
physicians' utilization of health care resources. Therefore, this 
prohibition would probably invalidate these risk-sharing mechanisms. 
Outlawing risk-sharing mechanisms, however, would amount to an 
abandonment of twenty years of policy making pursuant to which the 
be made in whole or in part under Medicare or [Medicaid] .... 
I d. 
189. Id. 
190. See id. (noting that the breadth of the Medicare-Medicaid Anti-Fraud and Abuse Statute has 
caused considerable concern among health care providers that "many relatively innocuous, or even 
beneficial commercial arrangements are technically covered by the statute and are, therefore, subject to 
criminal prosecution."). 
191 . See Haney & Bayles, supra note 2 (citing United States General Accounting Office report which 
concluded that "[l]ncentive plans may offer such strong financial incentives to physicians to reduce 
utilization that quality of care could be adversely affected through the withholding of needed services"). 
192. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-509, § 913 (c)(I)(E), 100 Stat. 
1874,2003 (1986) (codified as amended at 42 U .S.C. § 1320a-7a). Previously, the statute only applied to 
hospitals. Subsequently, Congress amended 42 U .S.C. § 1320a-7a(b)(l) again to delete references to 
HMOs. See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, § 4731(b)( l), 104 Stat. 
1388, 1388-95. 
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federal government has condoned financial risk-sharing arrangements. 
In the Federal HMO Act of 1973, the federal government 
acknowledged the role that risk sharing might play in the development 
of HMOs. The Federal HMO Act requires HMOs to assume full 
financial risk on a prospective basis for the provision of basic health 
services; however, the Act specifically authorizes provider risk sharing 
as a means to meet this responsibility. 193 In addition, the federal 
government itself introduced a type of risk sharing for Medicare through 
its introduction of the diagnosis related grouping (DRG) compensation 
methodology in 1983. 194 DRG compensation altered the traditional fee-
for-service methodology that had been used to compensate hospitals. 
Under DRG, the hospital would be entitled to a predetermined amount 
for each patient encounter dependent upon the patient's admission 
diagnosis. This represented a type of risk sharing because the hospital 
would only get a set fee regardless of how long it took to treat the 
patient. The risk assumed by the hospital was that it might lose money 
on the patient. 
Risk sharing has permeated federal thinking about health care cost 
containment. For example, the response to physicians' desire to 
combine forces to combat the market power exercised by payers was to 
create an antitrust safe harbor for physicians who, among other things, 
share substantial financial risk. 195 In other words, if physicians desire to 
193. See 42 U .S.C. § 300e(cX2)(D) (1994). HMOs may make "arrangements with physicians or other 
health professionals, health care institutions .. . to assume all or part of the financial risk on a prospective 
basis for the provision of basic health services .... " /d. Furthermore, federally qualified HMOs dealing 
with the Medicare program must have "effective procedures to monitor utilization and to control cost of 
basic and supplemental health services and to achieve utilization goals, which may include mechanisms 
such as risk sharing, financial incentives, or other provisions agreed to by providers." 42 C.F.R. 
417.103(b)B (1996). 
/d. 
194. See Thomas Bodenheimer, supra note 20, at 976. 
[U]nder DRGs Medicare pays the hospital a lump sum for each hospital admission, with 
the size of the payment dependent on the patient's diagnosis .. .. DRG reimbursement 
lumps together all services performed during one hospital episode ... . 
Under the DRG system ... the hospital is at risk for the length of hospital stay and for 
the resources used during the hospital stay. 
195. Su Department of justice and Federal Trade Commission Statements of Enforcement Policy 
and Analytical Principles Relating to Health Care and Antitrust, reprinled in 3 BNA Health L. Rep. 1376, 
1391 (Sept. 27, 1994). Statement No. 8 of the Department of Justice and FTC statements relates to 
physician network joint ventures. See id. The Statement notes that physician-controlled networks, which 
would otherwise be subject to antitrust enforcement for collectively agreeing on prices or other significant 
terms of competition, will not be challenged, if, among other things, the physicians in the group "share 
substantial financial risk." /d. at 1392. Sharing substantial financial risk may be: 
(I) when the venture agrees to provide services to a health benefits plan at a "capitated" 
rate; or 
(2) when the venture creates significant financial incentives for its members as a group to 
achieve specified cost-containment goals, such as withholding from all members a 
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jointly act against a payer, they need to share financial risks. The FTC 
and the Department of Justice indicate that physicians may share 
substantial financial risk by accepting a capitation agreement or by 
having their fees subject to a substantial withhold with the return 
dependent upon the entity meeting its cost saving goals. 196 
Given this history of support for risk sharing, the federal government 
needed to find a means to preserve risk sharing despite its acknowledged 
potential problems. Therefore, at the same time that Congress included 
HMOs in the prohibition, Congress delayed implementation of 
penalties against HMOs and instructed the Secretary of the Department 
of Health and Human Services (HHS) to develop some guidelines for 
risk sharing that would not violate the statute. 197 Subsequently, 
Congress repealed application of the strict prohibition as it applies to 
HMOs and instead adopted a more lenient standard for HMOs. 198 
Under the applicable standard, an HMO is prohibited from operating 
a plan under which a "specific payment is made directly or indirectly ... 
to a physician or physician group as an inducement to reduce or limit 
medically necessary services provided with respect to a specific 
individual enrolled with the organization." 199 The statute does not 
prohibit risk-sharing arrangements: "If the plan places a physician or 
group at substantial financial risk (as determined by the Secretary) for 
substantial amount of the compensation due to them, with distribution of that amount 
to the members only if the cost-containment goals are met. 
/d. (footnote omitted). 
196. Said. 
197. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (OBRA) of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-509, § 9313(c)(I)(E), 100 
Stat. 1874, 2003-04. 
The Secretary of Health and Human SeiVices shall report to Congress, not later than 
J anuary I, 1988, concerning incentive arrangements offered by health maintenance 
organizations and competitive medical plans to physicians. The report shall: 
(A) review the type of incentive arrangements in common use, 
(B) evaluate their potential to pressure improperly physicians to reduce or limit seiVices 
in a medically inappropriate manner, and 
(C) make recommendations concerning providing for an exception, to the prohibition 
contained in section 1128A(b) of the Social Security Act [the U.S.C. 1320a-7a(b) 
prohibition of payments to induce care reductions, for incentive arrangement to 
induce care reductions], for incentive arrangements that may be used by such 
organizations and plans to encourage efficiency in the utilization of medical and other 
seiVices but that do not have a substantial potential for adverse effect on quality. 
/d. A series of amendments eventually delayed implementation of the HMO-related penalties until April 
I, 1991. Said. § 9313(c)(E), 100 Stat. at 2003 (setting implementation date as April I, 1989); OBRA of 
1987, Pub. L. No. 100-203, § 4016, 101 Stat. 1330-64, 1330-64 (amending implementation of Pub. L. No. 
100-203 to April I , 1990); OBRA of 1988, Pub. L. No. 101-239, § 6207(a), 103 Stat. 2106, 2245 
(amending implementation of Pub. L. No. 100-203 to April!, 1991). 
198. OBRA of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, §4731, 104 Stat. 1388, 1388-195. 
199. /d. (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1395mm(i)(8)(A)(ii)(I)). 
., 
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services not provided by the physician or physician group," the 
organization must provide "stop-loss protection."200 
In other words, the Secretary ofHHS is charged with drawing a line 
between permissible and impermissible negative inducements. The 
Secretary must answer the question of what amount of financial risk will 
not cause the physician to underutilize health care resources. This is a 
rather misguided exercise. The appropriate guideline would be an 
amount of financial risk that would prevent a physician from rendering 
medically unnecessary services, but that would not cause the physician 
to withhold medically necessary services. This would appear to require 
pinpoint accuracy which, in turn, would require access to a numerical 
cause and effect relationship that is not only unknown, but perhaps 
unknowable. 
In order to define substantial financial risk, HHS examined the 
various risk-sharing compensation systems in effect in the market.201 
HHS noted that the key feature involved in financial risk systems was a 
differential between the potential high and low compensation that 
physicians could receive under any particular system. Under these 
systems, depending on the physician's attainment of the HMO cost-
200. 42 U.S. C.§ 1395mm (1)(8)(A)(li)(l). "Stop loss" is a device for limiting the physicians' losses to 
a designated dollar amount. Su Requirements for Physician Incentive Plans in Prepaid Health Care 
Organizations, 57 Fed. Reg. 59024, 59026 (1992). 
Many physicians incentive plans incorporate stop-loss protection to limit the liability of the 
physician or physician group. Most often, the stop-loss protection limits a physician's 
maximum liability per patient to a specific dollar amount. ... In some cases, prepaid health 
care organizations place an aggregate limit on the liability the physician could face .. . . 
Stop-loss protection is particularly common with capitation arrangements. 
!d.; see also DAVID W. LEE, CAPITATION: THE PHYSICIAN'S GUIDE 20 (1995) ("Reinsurance or stop-loss: 
An insurance plan in which the insurer agrees to share or assume treatment costs that exceed a predefined 
threshold amount."). Under the statute, a managed care organization would be responsible for providing 
such stop loss by either committing to cover the excess liability itself or purchasing a reinsurance policy, 
or reimbursing the physician for the expenses associated with a reinsurance policy. Requirements for 
Physician Incentive Plans in Prepaid Health Care Organizations, 57 Fed. Reg. at 59032. 
The organization can either provide or buy the stop-loss protection, or the physician or 
physician group can obtain the protection. · 
. . . Since the legislation requi res the organization to provide the stop-loss, we [the 
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)] are requiring the organization to pay 
the cost of the portion of stop-loss protection that covers its enrollees in the physician 
incentive plan, or increase the amount of stop-loss protection to account for the physician 's 
cost for stop loss. 
!d.; Thus, by defining "substantial financial risk," the Secretary ofHHS would place a limit on the degree 
of risk shifting that an entity could engage in with a physician or group of physicians. The entity which 
places physicians at a substantial risk was also obligated to conduct periodic surveys of its membership in 
order to "determine the degree of access of such individuals to services provided by the organization and 
satisfaction with the quality of services." 42 U.S.C. § 1395mm(l)(8)(A)(li)(II). 
20 I. Su Requirements for Physician Incentive Plans in Prepaid Health Care Organizations, 57 Fed. 
Reg. at 59,025-26, 59,028. 
528 UNIVERSITYOFCLNCLNNATI lAW REVIEW [Vol. 66 
containment goals, the physician's net income could vary. For example, 
if the system provided for a twenty percent fee withhold to pay for the 
services of specialists and for in-patient hospital services, the physician 
could get back all or none of the withheld fees depending on the cost 
performance--this represented a twenty percent differential between the 
low and high compensation that the physician could receive. HHS 
defined substantial financial risk for organizations that assess or 
distribute incentive payments more than once a year as twenty-five 
percent, and for organizations that assess or distribute incentive 
payments more than once a year as fifteen percent.202 
The effect of the proposed rule would be to set a limit on the degree 
of risk sharing that HMOs could impose on physicians. In the event 
that the HMO assessed the incentive arrangement not more than once 
a year, the HMO could not implement a plan that exposed more than 
twenty-five percent of the physician's income to risk for services not 
provided by the physician. The HMOs would need to provide stop-loss 
coverage for the physicians to prevent their losses. 
In order to determine that twenty-five percent was the appropriate 
risk threshold, HHS observed that, in the market it surveyed, withholds 
of twenty-five and thirty percent represented the upper ranges used 
under typical circumstances. 203 In addition, HHS relied on the fact that 
Group Health Associations of America identified the median withhold 
percentage as twenty percent.204 The agency justified its selection of the 
twenty percent threshold because: 
(1) It represented an industry standard which appeared to be 
acceptable to physicians; 
(2) Physicians were typically known to shoulder a risk of bad debt 
exposure of up to 20% of their fees; 
(3) Physicians were known to customarily discount their fees by 
20%.205 
Therefore, the agency reasoned: 
202. /d. at 59,027 . HHS established two risk thresholds because: 
[T]he shorter the timeframe over which incentive arrangements assess a physician's or a 
physician group's performance, the more influence the incentive arrangement will have. 
This is because physicians or physician groups have fewer patients in a short timeframe over 
which to spread the risk of expensive treatment than in a long timeframe. Since these types 
of arrangements have the potential to have a stronger influence on physician behavior, we 
believe that the lower risk threshold (15%] is appropriate. 
/d. at 59,030. 
203. See id. at 59,028. 
204. See id. This was based on a Group Health Association survey conducted in 1987. See id. 
205 . /d. at 59,028, 59,031. 
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[F]inancial incentive plans that place physicians or physician groups 
at risk for 25 percent of their payments ... would appear to be of the 
same magnitude as the reduction in payments many physicians 
voluntarily accept in return for increased volume and protection 
against bad debt, and in response to market place competition.206 
529 
This reasoning is flawed. If the goal of the regulations is to protect 
against the potential negative consequences of risk shifting, the market 
does not provide the best point of reference. By adopting the median 
withhold that its survey revealed existed in the marketplace, in effect, 
HHS defined substantial risk as risk in excess of what the average 
physician has accepted in a marketplace in which the physician is at a 
negotiating disadvantage.207 In other words, substantial risk is excess of 
what the market would bear. Basically, HHS proposed to adopt the 
industry norm as the threshold figure and relied on the fact that no 
discernible problems with patient care had arisen in the market. 208 
It is equally unreasonable to use a physician's acceptance of a twenty 
percent bad-debt experience to establish an acceptable threshold for 
determining substantial financial risk. Unlike risk-sharing mechanisms 
that place the physician's income at risk, the fact that the physician's bad 
debt is ten to twenty percent does not have the potential for inducing a 
physician to reduce services. Bad debt expense is, to a degree, 
something that is uncontrollable prior to rendering the service. It is 
within the physician's power to ensure that withheld fees are returned. 
Along similar lines, the fact that physicians discount their fees by as 
much as tweqty percent does not mean that a twenty percent fee 
withhold or other risk-sharing mechanism will not necessarily cause 
physicians to withhold medically necessary services. It has been 
observed that physicians will make up for discounts by increased volume 
of services. Also, the acceptance of a twenty percent discount has an air 
of inevitability about it-it is the product of absence of negotiating 
power that the physician accepts on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. 
Physicians may be able to control the loss of income resulting from risk 
sharing by withholding medically necessary services. In addition, HHS 
itself acknowledged the possibility that the withholds are typically not 
applied against the usual and customary physician's fees, but against fees 
that have already been discounted. 209 
206. Id. at 59,028. 
207. See supra notes 153-54 and accompanying text relating physicians' disadvantage when negotiating 
risk-sharing arrangements. 
208. See id. ("[I"] here is no evidence that conventional physician incentive plans ... have reduced 
access or caused quality of care problems."). 
209. Id. at 59,031 ("[W]e are concerned that such discounts may be factored into the plan's payments 
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The federal government's approach to risk sharing involves a shaky 
acceptance of the practices in the marketplace. This is done to preserve 
risk sharing, but also to curb its potential harm. In adopting this 
approach, the federal government can take comfort in the fact that 
empirical evidence seems to bear out the fact that the use of financial 
incentives has not reduced the quality of care for patients. 
Just as private sector payers, the government has an interest in risk 
sharing as a means to lower its costs of providing health benefits. Risk 
sharing allows implicit rationing. The federal government is no more 
interested in explicit health care rationing than the private sector 
payer.210 Therefore, the federal government is acting as a prudent payer 
of health care services; thus, it makes sense for the government to 
tolerate mechanisms used to shift some of the risk of providing health 
coverage to third parties. This also explains the growth in Medicare, 
Medicaid, and managed care plans under the Civilian Health and 
Medical Program of the Uniformed Service (CHAMPUS).211 This 
strategy, however, allows managed care organizations that accept 
Medicare risk contracts to export part of the cost of insuring 
beneficiaries of federal programs onto providers of health care services. 
In this manner, the federal government allows the private health care 
system to operate with the benefit of a hidden subsidy. If the federal 
government would embrace the corporate practice of medicine doctrine, 
it would curtail this hidden subsidy and would awaken the government, 
as well as private industry, to the true costs of doing business in the 
current fragmented system of health care financing. 
VIII. SOLUTIONS TO THE POTENFIAL PROBLEMS WITH 
RISK SHARING 
As developed throughout this Article, reassertion of the corporate 
practice of medicine doctrine would curtail risk-sharing arrangements. 
This would have the effect of requiring different actors in the health care 
financing system to shoulder their own costs of doing business and not 
receive hidden subsidies. This would be beneficial for a number of 
reasons, including restoration of trust between physicians and patients, 
to the physician or physician group. If so, the 25-percent risk would be applied to an already discounted 
amount, which may not be reasonable."). 
210. See, e.g., David L. Weigert, Tragic Clwias: S!.ok DiscreliJm Over Organ TransplanJ Funding For Medicaid 
&cipimts, 89 Nw. U. L. Rev. 268, 296-97 (discussing the federal government's historical reluctance to ration 
health care due to the "symbolic blackmail" involved ~hen an identifiable life will be affected by the 
explicit decision to deny payment for medically necessary but expensive services). 
211 . See supra note 31 and accompanying text. 
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preventing implicit rationing of health care services, and forcing a more 
honest debate about health care financing. However, policy makers and 
commentators have proposed solutions to address risk sharing by 
methods other than outright prohibition. The idea appears to be that 
we can control the problem if we can tame it. We can tame it if we can 
name it; therefore, some proposals are directed at having disclosures 
made to patients about the risk-sharing relationships.212 Other 
commentators believe that risk sharing does not pose a significant 
problem because the tort system could punish financially motivated 
decisions, and because physicians must act so as to avoid losing their 
licenses.213 
Disclosure of risk-sharing arrangements would be an ineffective 
solution. Such a disclosure cheapens the physician-patient relationship, 
thereby further undermining the patient's trust in the physician. This 
tends to exacerbate, rather than ameliorate, the problems associated 
with risk-sharing arrangements. This could lead to additional 
questioning about physicians' decisions, which would introduce even 
further inefficiency into the system. This disclosure also does not benefit 
patients because there may be nothing that they could do with the 
information that is relevant to curtailing the potential abuse. To the 
extent that these forms of risk sharing are prevalent, the patient does not 
have the option of seeking providers that are not covered by a risk-
sharing arrangement. 214 
It has been argued that risk sharing does not cause physicians to 
underutilize medical services because of the threat of liability or 
professional sanctions.215 Therefore, risk sharing does not provide any 
real danger to the patients. The tort system will serve as an effective 
deterrent to abuse of risk-sharing arrangements. 
212. &e, e.g., McGraw, supra note 7; Mary Anne Bobinski, supra note 25, at 387 ("Disclosure may be 
a particularly important tool to protect consumers as our health system evolves."). 
213. See Hall, supra note 21 , at 766 (arguing against the inadequacy of disclosure requirements by 
noting, among other things, the possibility of tort claims). 
214. See Mechanic & Schlesinger, supra note 9, at 1694. 
(P]atients would be placed in a diffcult position of trying to interpret what they were told, 
trying to understand the implications of different risk pools, and/ or trying to assess the 
consequences of financial risk. Even if they do understand, many patients face restricted 
options because of lack of choice or few significant differences among the plans available to 
them. 
Id.; see also McGraw, supra note 7, at 1845 ("[A]t the moment the patient is deciding whether to adopt a 
physician's treatment recommendation, the information about possible financial conflict of interest may 
come too late. The patient is already enrolled in the insurance plan, and may not be able to seek care 
elsewhere."). 
215. See Hall, supra note 21 , at 766. 
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However, the courts have been loath to recognize the connection 
between risk sharing and a patient's injuries. There are few reported 
cases in which the connection between the compensation arrangement 
and some perceived harm has been raised. Other than the case Bush v. 
Dake,216 plaintiffs have uniformly been denied the ability to present the 
connection to the jury. It is as if the courts have been afflicted by a 
collective amnesia induced by twenty years of cost-containment oriented 
policy making, which has made them forget the perils oflay interference 
with physician decision making. 
In Sweetie v. Cigna Healthplan of Delaware, Inc., 217 the plaintiff alleged that 
the physician committed gross negligence by failing to timely refer her 
to a surgeon when it was discovered that she had a lump in her breast. 
The plaintiff alleged that the physician's delay in making the referral 
was influenced by financial incentives in Cigna's compensation 
arrangement with the physician. Her allegation was that Cigna's system 
of capitation and fee withholding induced her physician to withhold her 
care. The plaintiff claimed punitive damages because the defendant 
recklessly delayed referring the plaintiff to a surgeon because of the 
financial incentives. In the court's view, "[t]he number of referrals or 
hospitalizations made by any one individual physician does not control 
whether that physician will receive a return of his withholds."218 
Therefore, the court ruled that any connection between Cigna's 
capitation-withhold policy and the physician's decision regarding 
referring the plaintiff to a surgeon was "too remote to be of significant 
probative value."219 According to the court, the facts, taken together, 
did not support submitting the question of punitive damages to the jury. 
Teti v. US. Health Care involved a. claim under the Racketeer 
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) against an HMO by 
its enrollees.220 The basis of the enrollees' claim was that the HMO had 
concealed from them the existence of risk-sharing arrangements with the 
HMO's physicians.221 The enrollees claimed that the concealment 
constituted a pattern of fraudulent nondisclosure violative of RICO. 
The court dismissed the RICO claim, reasoning that RICO requires an 
216. Bush v. /Jah is an unpublished opinion which is reprinted in FuRROW ET AL., supra note 2, at 
384. 
217. 1989 WL 12608 (Del. Super. Ct. 1989). 
218. ld. at *5. 
219. ld. 
220. Teti v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., Nos. 88-9808,88-9822, 1989 U .S. Dist. LEXIS 14041, at *I (E.D. 
Pa. Nov. 20, 1989). 
221. &e id. at *2-3. 
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enterprise operated for the furtherance of crime and that the plaintiff 
had failed to raise a genuine fact issue on this point. 222 
In Pulvers v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc., 223 the plaintiffs alleged 
that the Kaiser Permanente HMO committed fraud in the enrollment 
process by holding itself out as "nonprofit" when its physicians were 
covered by financial incentive arrangements. The plaintiffs alleged that 
the physicians acted "for profit" in a nonprofit HM0.224 The court held 
that the incentive plans are recommended by professional organizations 
and required by the Federal HMO Act of 1973. According to the 
HMO Act, HMOs must have effective procedures to monitor 
utilization, to control cost ofbasic and supplemental health services, and 
to achieve utilization goals, which may include mechanisms such as risk 
sharing, financial incentives, or other provisions agreed to by 
providers. 225 
Madsen v. Park Nuollet Medical Cente-?26 was a medical negligence case. 
The plaintif(.attempted to introduce evidence that a pregnant mother's 
status as an HMO member meant that her hospitalization could have 
adversely affected the physician's profit. The plaintiff wanted the jury 
to consider whether this factor contributed to her physician's failure to 
inform her about the need for hospitalization. 227 The court upheld the 
lower court's decision to exclude this information noting that the 
information "was only marginally relevant, and potentially very 
prejudicial. "228 
These cases indicate that the courts may be rather reluctant to 
recognize any connection between physicians' financial incentives and 
medical injuries. However, even if the courts could recognize such a 
causal relationship, using the tort system to police quality would 
misplace the burden. It would mean that the physicians would bear the 
legal liability for activities that benefit the payers. This misplaced 
burden is exacerbated by that fact that ERISA preempts state law causes 
of action arising from the denial of benefits by managed care plans 
providing health coverage pursuant to an employer-sponsored health 
benefit plan. 229 
222. See id. at *4. 
223. 99 Cal. App. 3d 560 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979). 
224. ld. at 565. 
225. ld. 
226. 419 N.W.2d 5 11 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988), rev'd on other grounds, 431 N.W.2d 855 (Minn. 1988). 
T he plaintiff in this case was the father. See id. at 512. He alleged that the mother of his son had been 
negligently treated during pregnancy. See id. 
22 7. Seeid. at5 15. 
228. [d. 
229. See, e.g., Corcoran v. United Healthcare, Inc., 965 F.2d 1321, 1332 (5th Cir. 1992) (holding that 
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Furthermore, reliance on the tort system does not yield the 
appropriate answer if the goal is to reduce medically unnecessary care. 
Is the treatment decision that is the end result of the interplay between 
negative financial inducements on the one hand, and the threat of 
malpractice suits on the other hand, the right decision, or only the 
expedient decision? This seems like a rather ingenuous and circuitous 
method of eliminating medically unnecessary care. 
IX. CONCLUSION 
The corporate practice of medicine doctrine helped to improve the 
reputation of organized medicine in the United States. The doctrine 
prohibited entanglements between the physicians' exercise of their 
professional judgments and the profit-making endeavors of lay 
organizations. The purpose of the doctrine was to maintain the 
physician's independence and help the physician operate as a fiduciary. 
However, the doctrine also had anticompetitive consequences that 
caused the federal government to implement policies which undermined 
the doctrine. This has allowed cost containment to proceed in a manner 
that allows payers to export the costs of doing business to providers of 
health care services. The exportation of costs represents a hidden 
subsidy to the private insurance industry. This subsidy is maintained at 
the expense of the integrity of the patient-physician relationship. It 
combines in one decision maker inherently antagonistic functions. This 
involves physicians in the insurance function and thereby undermines 
the fiduciary relationship between patients and their physicians. The 
federal government has condoned and promoted risk-sharing 
arrangements and has taken the position that it can protect patients 
from the abuse of risk sharing by stipulating a magic threshold for risk 
sharing. As long as the federal government declines to heed the message 
of the corporate practice doctrine, the search for health care cost 
containment will yield approaches that are dangerous or dishonest, or 
both. 
patient state law claim against HMO based on denial of benefits was preempted by ERISA). See supra notes 
159-63 and accompanying text for background on ERISA. 
